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Abstract
Referring is one of the most basic and prevalent uses of language. How do speakers choose
from the wealth of referring expressions at their disposal? Rational theories of language use
have come under attack for decades for not being able to account for the seemingly irrational
overinformativeness ubiquitous in referring expressions. Here we present a novel production
model of referring expressions within the Rational Speech Act framework that treats speakers
as agents that rationally trade off cost and informativeness of utterances. Crucially, we relax the
assumption that informativeness is computed with respect to a deterministic Boolean semantics,
in favor of a non-deterministic continuous semantics. This innovation allows us to capture a large
number of seemingly disparate phenomena within one unified framework: the basic asymmetry
in speakers’ propensity to overmodify with color rather than size; the increase in overmodification
in complex scenes; the increase in overmodification with atypical features; and the increase in
specificity in nominal reference as a function of typicality. These findings cast a new light on
the production of referring expressions: rather than being wastefully overinformative, reference
is usefully redundant.
Keywords: language production; reference; overinformativeness; experimental pragmatics; Bayesian
modeling
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When redundancy is useful: A Bayesian approach to ‘overinformative’ referring expressions
1 Overinformativeness in referring expressions
Reference to objects is one of the most basic and prevalent uses of language. In order to refer,
speakers must choose from a wealth of referring expressions at their disposal. How does a speaker
decide whether to call an object the animal, the dog, the dalmatian, or the big mostly white dalma-
tian? The context within which the object occurs (other non-dogs, other dogs, other dalmatians)
plays a large part in determining which features the speaker chooses to include in their utterance
– speakers aim to be sufficiently informative to establish unique reference to the intended object.
However, speakers’ utterances exhibit what has been claimed to be overinformativeness: referring
expressions are often more specific than necessary for establishing unique reference, and they are
more specific in systematic ways.
This paper is concerned with developing a unified quantitative account for these systematic
patterns, which has so far proven elusive. We formalize our account as a computational model of
referring expression production within the Rational Speech Act framework (M. C. Frank & Good-
man, 2012; Goodman & Frank, 2016; Franke & Ja¨ger, 2016), which treats speakers as boundedly
rational agents who optimize the tradeoff between utterance cost and informativeness. Our key
innovation is to relax the assumption that informativeness of utterances is computed with respect
to a deterministic Boolean semantics. Under this relaxed semantics, certain terms may apply better
than others to an object without strictly being true or false. This idea has its oldest modern pre-
cursor in fuzzy logic (Zadeh, 1965). It is similar in spirit to recently proposed models of meaning in
both computational semantics, which assign probabilities rather than truth conditions to sentences
(Bernardy, Blanck, Chatzikyriakidis, & Lappin, 2018), and in NLP, which treat word and sentence
meanings as vectors of real numbers (Pennington, Socher, & Manning, 2014; Peters et al., 2018;
Devlin, Chang, Lee, & Toutanova, 2018).
As we will show, computing utterance informativeness with respect to these more graded mean-
ings can explain a number of seemingly disparate phenomena. We restrict ourselves to definite
descriptions of the form the (ADJ ?)+ NOUN, that is, noun phrases that minimally contain the
definite determiner the followed by a head noun, with any number of restrictive adjectives occur-
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ring between the determiner and the noun.1 This broad class of referring expressions subsumes two
domains in language production that have been typically treated as separate. The choice of adjec-
tives in (purportedly) overmodified referring expressions has been a primary focus of the language
production literature (Herrmann & Deutsch, 1976; Pechmann, 1989; Nadig & Sedivy, 2002; Sedivy,
2003; Maes, Arts, & Noordman, 2004; Engelhardt, Bailey, & Ferreira, 2006; Arts, Maes, Noordman,
& Jansen, 2011; Koolen, Gatt, Goudbeek, & Krahmer, 2011; Rubio-Fernandez, 2016), while the
choice of noun in simple nominal expressions has so far mostly received attention in the concepts
and categorization literature (Rosch, 1973; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976)
and in the developmental literature on generalizing basic level terms (Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007; but
see Dale & Reiter, 1995 for a treatment of basic level terms in natural language generation).
In Section 1 we review several key overinformativeness phenomena across these literatures that
have presented a puzzle for rational accounts of language use. In Section 2 we introduce the
basic Rational Speech Act framework with deterministic Boolean semantics and show how it can
be extended to a relaxed semantics. In Sections 3 - 5 we evaluate the relaxed semantics RSA
model on data from interactive online reference game experiments that exhibit the phenomena
introduced in Section 1: asymmetries in size and color modifier choice under varying conditions
of scene complexity; typicality effects in the choice of color modifier; and choice of nominal level
of reference. In each case, our model explains why seemingly overinformative modifiers or overly
specific nouns can in fact be useful and informative; not doing so might lead the listener astray, or
require them to invest too much processing effort. We wrap up in Section 6 by summarizing our
findings and discussing the far-reaching implications of and further challenges for this line of work.
1.1 Production of referring expressions: a case against rational language use?
How should a cooperative speaker choose between competing referring expressions? Grice, in his
seminal work, provided some guidance by formulating his famous conversational maxims, intended
as a guide to listeners’ expectations about cooperative speaker behavior (Grice, 1975). His maxim
of Quantity, consisting of two parts, requires of speakers to:
1In contrast, we will not provide a treatment of pronominal referring expressions, indefinite descriptions, names,
definite descriptions with post-nominal modification, or non-restrictive modifier uses, though we offer some speculative
remarks on how the approach outlined here can be applied to these cases.
USEFULLY REDUNDANT REFERRING EXPRESSIONS 5
1. Quantity-1: Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the purposes of the
exchange).
2. Quantity-2: Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
That is, speakers should aim to produce neither under- nor overinformative utterances. While
much support has been found for the avoidance of underinformativeness (Brennan & Clark, 1996;
R. Brown, 1958; Olson, 1970; Levinson, 1983; Engelhardt et al., 2006; Davies & Katsos, 2013),
speakers seem remarkably willing to systematically violate Quantity-2. For example, they routinely
produce modifiers that are not necessary for uniquely establishing reference (e.g., the small blue pin
instead of the small pin in contexts like Figure 1a; Gatt, van Gompel, Krahmer, & van Deemter,
2011; Gatt, Krahmer, van Deemter, & van Gompel, 2014; Arts et al., 2011; Koolen et al., 2011)
and routinely use a basic level term even when a superordinate level term would be sufficient (e.g.,
the dog instead of the animal in contexts like Figure 3; Rosch et al., 1976; Hoffmann & Ziessler,
1983; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991a; Johnson & Mervis, 1997; R. Brown, 1958).
These observations have posed a challenge for theories of language production, especially those
positing rational language use (including the Gricean one): why this extra expenditure of useless
effort? Why this seeming blindness to the level of informativeness requirement? Many have argued
from these observations that speakers are in fact not economical (Engelhardt et al., 2006; Pechmann,
1989). Some have appealed to a built-in preference for referring at the basic level from considerations
of conceptual representation or perceptual factors such as shape (Rosch et al., 1976; Rosch, 1973;
Murphy & Smith, 1982). Others have argued for salience-driven effects on willingness to overmodify
(Gatt et al., 2014; Westerbeek, Koolen, & Maes, 2015). In all cases, it is argued that informativeness
itself cannot be the key factor in determining the content of speakers’ referring expressions. Here we
revisit this claim and show that systematically relaxing the requirement of a deterministic Boolean
semantics for referring expressions also systematically changes the informativeness of utterances.
This results in a reconceptualization of what have been termed overinformative referring expressions
as usefully redundant referring expressions. We begin by reviewing the phenomena of interest that
a revised theory of definite referring expressions should be able to account for.
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(a) Size sufficient. (b) Color sufficient.
Figure 1: Example contexts where (a) size only (e.g., the small pin) or (b) color only (e.g., the blue
pin) is sufficient for unique reference. Thick border marks the intended referent.
1.2 Overinformativeness in modified referring expressions
Most of the literature on overinformative referring expressions has been devoted to the use of over-
informative modifiers in modified referring expressions. The prevalent observation is that speakers
frequently do not include only the minimal modifiers required for establishing reference, but often
also include redundant modifiers (Pechmann, 1989; Nadig & Sedivy, 2002; Maes et al., 2004; En-
gelhardt et al., 2006; Arts et al., 2011; Koolen et al., 2011). However, not all modifiers are created
equal: there are systematic differences in the overmodification patterns observed for size adjectives
(e.g., big, small), color adjectives (e.g., blue, red), material adjectives (e.g., plastic, wooden), and
others (Sedivy, 2003). Furthermore, these asymmetries interact with features of the context and
world knowledge about the typicality of different properties.
Asymmetry in redundant use of color and size adjectives. In Figure 1a, distinguishing
the object highlighted by the thick border requires only mentioning its size (the small pin). It is
now well-documented that speakers routinely include redundant color adjectives (the small blue
pin) which are not necessary for uniquely singling out the intended referent in these kinds of
contexts (Pechmann, 1989; Belke & Meyer, 2002; Gatt et al., 2011). However, the same is not true
for size: in contexts like Figure 1b, where color is sufficient for unique reference (the blue pin),
speakers overmodify much more rarely. Though there is quite a bit of variation in proportions of
overmodification, this asymmetry in the propensity for overmodifying with color but not size has
been documented repeatedly (Pechmann, 1989; Sedivy, 2003; Gatt et al., 2011; Rubio-Fernandez,
2016; Westerbeek et al., 2015; Koolen, Goudbeek, & Krahmer, 2013).
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(a) Typical color, type sufficient. (b) Atypical color, type sufficient.
Figure 2: Example contexts where type (banana) is sufficient for unique reference and color is (a)
typical or (b) atypical. A thick border marks the intended referent.
Scene variation. Speakers’ propensity to overmodify with color is highly dependent on features
of the distractor objects in the context. In particular, as the variation present in the scene increases,
so does the probability of overmodifying. For example Koolen et al. (2013) consistently found higher
rates of overmodification with color adjectives in high-variation scenes (28-27%) compared to the
low-variation ones (4-10%). Scene variation has been quantified in several different ways: the
number of dimensions along which objects differ Koolen et al. (2013), the number of distractors
present in a scene Gatt, Krahmer, Van Deemter, and van Gompel (2017), and whether objects are
‘simple’ or ‘compositional’ Davies and Katsos (2013). A model of referring expression generation
should ideally capture all of these types of variation in a unified way.
Feature typicality. Overmodification with color has also been shown to be systematically related
to the typicality of the color for the object. Westerbeek et al. (2015) have shown that the more
typical a color is for an object, the less likely it is to be mentioned when not necessary for unique
reference (see also Sedivy, 2003; Rubio-Fernandez, 2016). For example, speakers never refer to
a yellow banana in the absence of other bananas as the yellow banana (see Figure 2a), but they
sometimes refer to a brown banana as the brown banana, and they almost always refer to a blue
banana as the blue banana (see Figure 2b). Similar typicality effects have been shown for other
(non-color) properties. For example, Mitchell (2013) showed that speakers are more likely to include
an atypical than a typical property (either shape or material) when referring to everyday objects
like boxes when mentioning at least one property was necessary for unique reference.
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(a) Subordinate level term necessary. (b) Superordinate level term sufficient.
Figure 3: Example contexts in which different levels of reference are necessary for establishing
unique reference to the target marked with a thick border. (a) subordinate (dalmatian) necessary;
(b) superordinate (animal) sufficient, but basic (dog) or subordinate (dalmatian) possible.
Table 1: List of effects a theory of referring expression production should account for and paper
section(s) in which they are treated.
Section Effect Description
2 & 3 Color/size asymmetry More redundant use of color than size 2
2 & 3 Scene variation More redundant use of color with increasing scene variation 3
4 Color typicality More redundant use of color with decreasing color typicality 4
5 Basic level preference Preference for basic level term when superordinate sufficient 5
5 Subordinate level use Unnecessary use of subordinate level term 6
1.3 Overinformativeness in nominal referring expressions
Even in the absence of modifying adjectives, a referring expression can be more or less informative:
the dalmatian communicates more information about the object in question than the dog (being a
dalmatian entails being a dog), which in turn is globally more informative than the animal. Thus,
this choice can be considered analogous to the choice of adding more modifiers – in both cases, the
speaker has a choice of being more or less specific about the intended referent. A well-documented
effect from the concepts and categorization literature is that speakers prefer to refer at the basic
level (Rosch et al., 1976; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991b). That is, in the absence of other constraints,
even when a superordinate level term would be sufficient for establishing reference (as in Figure 3b),
speakers prefer to say the dog rather than the animal. However, there are systematic exceptions:
in some cases when the basic level would be sufficient, speakers prefer the subordinate term. For
example, atypical birds like penguins are often referred to at the subordinate level rather than at
the basic level bird (Jolicoeur, Gluck, & Kosslyn, 1984). Indeed, children may even use expectations
about such referential preferences to infer narrower categories from atypical exemplars during word
learning (Emberson, Loncar, Mazzei, Treves, & Goldberg, 2019).
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2 Modeling speakers’ choice of referring expression
To date, there is no theory to account for all of these different phenomena (see Table 1), and no
model has attempted to unify the domains of modified and nominal referring expressions. Here
we propose an explicit computational account of how multiple factors — including an utterance’s
literal semantics, its contextual informativity, its cost relative to alternative utterances, and the
typicality of an object or its features — interact in referring expression production. We argue
that this model provides a principled explanation for the phenomena reviewed in the previous
section and holds promise for being generalizable to many further production phenomena related
to overinformativeness, which we discuss in relation to previous accounts in Section 6.
Our model is formulated within the Rational Speech Act (RSA) framework (M. C. Frank &
Goodman, 2012; Goodman & Frank, 2016).7 We proceed by first presenting the general production
framework in Section 2.1, and show why the most basic model, as formulated by M. C. Frank
& Goodman, 2012, does not produce the phenomena outlined above due to its strong focus on
speakers maximizing the informativeness of expressions under a deterministic Boolean semantics.
In Section 2.2 we introduce our crucial innovation: relaxing the semantics.
2.1 Basic RSA
The production component of RSA aims to soft-maximize the utility of utterances, where utility
is defined in terms of the contextual informativeness of an utterance, given each utterance’s literal
semantics. Formally, this is treated as a pragmatic speaker S1 reasoning about a literal listener L0,
who can be described by the following formula:
2Reported by many (e.g., Pechmann, 1989; Engelhardt et al., 2006; Gatt et al., 2011; Rubio-Fernandez, 2016)
3Multiple replications reported (e.g., Davies & Katsos, 2013; Koolen et al., 2013)
4Multiple replications reported (e.g. Sedivy, 2003; Westerbeek et al., 2015; Rubio-Fernandez, 2016)
5Originally reported by Rosch et al. (1976), dozens of replications.
6Reported by Jolicoeur et al. (1984)
7All RSA models and Bayesian data analyses reported in this paper were implemented in the probabilistic pro-
gramming language WebPPL (Goodman & Stuhlmu¨ller, electronic) and can be viewed at https://github.com/
thegricean/RE production. All experimental materials and analysis scripts are available in the same repository. An
interactive browser-based toy model is provided at http://forestdb.org/models/overinf.html.
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PL0(o|u) ∝ L(u, o). (1)
The literal listener L0 observes an utterance u from the set of utterances U , consisting of single
adjectives denoting features available in the context of a set of objects O, and returns a distribution
over objects o ∈ O. Here, L(u, o) is the lexicon that encodes deterministic lexical meanings such
that:
L(u, o) =
 1 if u is true of o0 otherwise. (2)
Thus, PL0(o|u) returns a uniform distribution over all contextually available o in the extension
of u. For example, in the size-sufficient context shown in Figure 1a, U = {big , small , blue, red} and
O = {obig blue, obig red, osmall blue}. Upon observing blue, the literal listener therefore assigns equal
probability to obig blue and osmall blue. Values of PL0(o|u) for each u are shown on the left in Table
2.
The pragmatic speaker in turn produces an utterance with probability proportional to the utility
of that utterance:
PS1(u|o) ∝ eU(u,o) (3)
The speaker’s utility U(u, o) is a function of both the utterance’s informativeness with respect
to the literal listener PL0(o|u) and the utterance’s cost c(u):
U(u, o) = βi lnPL0(o|u)− βcc(u) (4)
Two free parameters, βi and βc enter the computation, weighting the respective contributions
of informativeness and utterance cost, respectively.8 In order to understand the effect of βi, it is
8M. C. Frank and Goodman (2012) fixed βi = 1 and did not include cost in their formulation, because they
assumed equal costs for all utterances. Subsequent work has demonstrated the importance of taking into account
utterance cost in modeling interpretation phenomena like cost-based quantity implicatures (Rohde, Seyfarth, Clark,
Ja¨ger, & Kaufmann, 2012; Degen, Franke, & Ja¨ger, 2013) and M-implicature (Bergen, Levy, & Goodman, 2016). We
include it here because of the importance that cost has played in explanations of overinformative referring expressions,
where it typically surfaces as the idea that speakers have different overall preferences for mentioning color vs. size
modifiers (Dale & Reiter, 1995; Koolen et al., 2011; van Gompel, van Deemter, Gatt, Snoeren, & Krahmer, 2019).
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useful to explore its effect when utterances are cost-free. In this case, as βi approaches infinity, the
speaker increasingly only chooses utterances that maximize informativeness; if βi is 0, informative-
ness is disregarded and the speaker chooses randomly from the set of all available utterances; if βi
is 1, the speaker probability-matches, i.e., chooses utterances proportional to their informativeness
(equivalent to Luce’s choice rule, Luce, 1959). Applied to the example in Table 2, if the speaker
wants to refer to osmall blue they have two semantically possible utterances, small and blue, where
small is twice as informative as blue. They produce small with probability 1 when βi →∞, proba-
bility 2/3 when βi = 1 and probability 1/4 when βi = 0.
9 Conversely, disregarding informativeness
and focusing only on cost, any asymmetry in costs will be exaggerated with increasing βc, such
that the speaker will choose the least costly utterance with higher and higher probability as βc
increases.
As has been pointed out by van Gompel et al. (2019), the basic Rational Speech Act model
described so far (M. C. Frank & Goodman, 2012) does not generate overinformative referring ex-
pressions for two reasons. One of these is trivial: U only contains one-word utterances. We can
ameliorate this easily by allowing complex two-word utterances. We assume an intersective seman-
tics for complex utterances ucomplex that consist of a two adjective sequence usize ∈ {big , small}
and ucolor ∈ {blue, red}, such that the meaning of a complex two-word utterance is defined as
L(ucomplex, o) = L(usize, o)× L(ucolor, o). (5)
The resulting renormalized literal listener distributions for our example size-sufficient context in
Figure 1a are shown in the left columns in Table 2,10 and the concomitant pragmatic speaker
At this point we remain agnostic about the factors that contribute to an utterance’s cost c(u). In later sections we
allow cost to be a function of properties (e.g. color & size) mentioned in the utterance, or of an utterance’s empirical
length and corpus frequency; our policy for these cases is to introduce free cost parameters for each linear component
of the cost function.
9Note that instead of a βi parameter weighting informativeness inside the utility function, other recent for-
mulations have used an α parameter modulating the entire utility function, i.e. PS1(u|o) ∝ expαU(u, o). These
parameterizations are equivalent. In the present work, where informativeness and cost both play important roles, we
chose the ‘flattened’ linear combination with independent weights for simplicity.
10‘Normalization’ refers to the process of turning a set of numbers into a probability distribution by dividing each
number by the sum of all the numbers in the set, such that they add up to 1.
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Table 2: Row-wise literal listener distributions PL0(o|u) for each utterance u in the size-sufficient
context depicted in Figure 1a, under a deterministic Boolean semantics (left) or under a continuous
semantics (right) with xsize = .8, xcolor = .99. Bolded numbers indicate crucial comparisons between
literal listener probabilities in correctly selecting the intended referent osmall blue in response to
observing the sufficient small and the redundant small blue utterances.
Boolean continuous
obig blue obig red osmall blue obig blue obig red osmall blue
big .5 .5 0 .39 .39 .22
small 0 0 1 .26 .26 .48
blue .5 0 .5 .42 .16 .42
red 0 1 0 .21 .57 .21
big blue 1 0 0 .50 .23 .27
big red 0 1 0 .24 .52 .24
small blue 0 0 1 .27 .23 .50
Table 3: Column-wise pragmatic speaker distributions PS1(u|o) for each object o in the size-
sufficient context depicted in Figure 1a, under a deterministic Boolean semantics (left) or under a
continuous semantics (middle, right) with xsize = .8, xcolor = .99, with βi set to 1 (middle) or 30
(right). Bolded numbers indicate the relevant speaker probabilities for the minimal (small) and
redundant (small blue) utterances when intending to communicate referent osmall blue.
Boolean continuous (betai = 1) continuous (βi = 30)
obig blue obig red osmall blue obig blue obig red osmall blue obig blue obig red osmall blue
big .25 .2 0 .17 .17 .09 0 0 0
small 0 0 .4 .11 .11 .20 0 0 .21
blue .25 0 .2 .18 .07 .18 .01 0 0
red 0 .4 0 .09 .24 .09 0 .93 0
big blue .5 0 0 .22 .10 .12 .99 0 0
big red 0 .4 0 .10 .22 .10 0 .07 0
small blue 0 0 .4 .12 .10 .21 0 0 .79
distributions are shown in the left columns in Table 3.11
Unfortunately, simply including complex utterances in the set of alternatives does not solve the
problem. We turn again to the case where the speaker wants to communicate the small blue object.
There are now two useful utterances, small and small blue, for referring to this object. Because
they are equally informative (see bolded numbers in Table 2, column 3), the pragmatic speaker
is equally likely to produce them (see bolded numbers in Table 3, column 3). The only way for
the more complex utterance to be chosen with greater probability than the simple utterance is if
it was the cheaper one. While this would achieve the desired mathematical effect, the cognitive
11An interactive toy version of this model is provided at http://forestdb.org/models/overinf.html.
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plausibility of complex utterances being cheaper than simple utterances is highly dubious12. Thus
we must look elsewhere to break the symmetry and account for overinformativeness. We propose
that the place to look is the computation of informativeness itself.
2.2 RSA with continuous semantics
Here we introduce the crucial innovation: rather than assuming a deterministic Boolean semantics
that returns true (1) or false (0) for any combination of expression and object, we relax to a
continuous semantics that returns real values in the interval [0, 1]. Formally, the only change is in
the values that the lexicon can return:
L(u, o) ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ R (6)
That is, rather than assuming that an object is unambiguously big (or not) or unambiguously blue
(or not), this continuous semantics captures that objects count as big or blue to varying degrees
(similar to approaches in fuzzy logic, prototype theory, and recent developments in NLP; Zadeh,
1965; Rosch, 1973; Bernardy et al., 2018).
Another approach to relaxing the deterministic Boolean semantics would be to relax the de-
terminism. This can be done either by assuming a semantics which is fundamentally Boolean,
but whose truth-values contain an element of randomness; or by assuming a fully deterministic
Boolean semantics with intensional parameters that are themselves random variables. This is ap-
pealing because if would preserve the existing machinery of standard truth-functional compositional
semantics. It can be shown that using continuous semantic values in the RSA model is equivalent
to using Boolean values that are chosen non-deterministically. Conversely, marginalizing over the
randomness in a Boolean semantics yields a probability of truth, which is a value between 0 and
1. For this reason we will sometimes refer to the relaxed semantics as a “noisy” semantics, and
the deviation of the semantic value from 0 or 1 as the degree of noise. We will generally treat the
relaxed semantics in its continuous value guise, as it simplifies exposition and development.
We now show via simulations that this model can qualitatively account both for speakers’
12See also the discussion of cost functions in Krahmer, van Erk, and Verleg (2003), who explicitly introduce this
monotonicity constraint as a constraint on the search space of possible referring expressions within a graph-based
framework.
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asymmetric propensity to overmodify with color rather than with size (in Section 2.2.1) and for
speakers’ propensity to overmodify more with increasing scene variation (in Section 2.2.2). The
intuition, using the example from Figure 1a, is that blue and small do not apply equally well to
all roughly blue, roughly small objects, and that a speaker might opt to include more modifiers
when any one alone might not be a perfectly apt descriptor. Assuming that blue is more precise
than small leads the speaker to overmodify more with color than with size – and further, the more
variability is present in the scene, the more the precision of color helps weed out non-intended
referents, i.e., the more color overmodification occurs.
2.2.1 Simulation 1: color-size asymmetry
To see the basic effect of switching to a continuous semantics, and to see how far we can get in
capturing overinformativeness patterns with this change, let us explore a simple semantics in which
all colors are treated the same, all sizes are as well, and the two compose via a product rule.
That is, when an object o is in the extension of a size adjective under a Boolean semantics – i.e.,
when the size can be truthfully predicated of o – we take L(u, o) = xsize, a constant; when it is
not in the extension of the adjective – i.e., when the size cannot be truthfully predicated of o –
L(u, o) = 1 − xsize. Similarly for color adjectives. This results in two free model parameters, xsize
and xcolor, that can take on different values, capturing that size and color adjectives may apply
more or less well/reliably to objects. Together with the product composition rule, Eq. 5, this fully
specifies a relaxed semantic function for our reference domain.13
Now consider the RSA literal listener, Eq. 1, who uses these relaxed semantic values. Given
an utterance, the listener simply normalizes over potential referents. As an example, the resulting
renormalized literal listener distributions for the size-sufficient example context in Figure 1a are
shown for values xsize = .8 and xcolor = .99 on the right in Table 2.
14 Recall that in this context,
the speaker intends for the listener to select the small blue pin. To see which would be the best
utterance to produce for this purpose, we compare the literal listener probabilities in the osmall blue
column. The two best utterances under both the Boolean and the continuous semantics are bolded
13An interactive toy version of this model is provided at http://forestdb.org/models/overinf.html.
14These values were chosen for the demonstration because they are the ones that result in the best approximation
of the proportion of redundant referring expressions reported in van Gompel et al. (2019): 79% in size-sufficient
contexts; 7% in color-sufficient contexts.
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in the table: under the Boolean semantics, the two best utterances are small and small blue, with
no difference in listener probability. In contrast, under the continuous semantics small has a smaller
literal listener probability (.48) of retrieving the intended referent than the redundant small blue
(.50). While this difference may appear small, it is enough to break the symmetry in utterance
informativeness. Consequently, the pragmatic speaker will be more likely to produce small blue
than small, though the precise probabilities depend on the cost and informativeness parameters βc
and βi. Table 3 shows the resulting pragmatic speaker probabilities under a low and a high βi with
no utterance cost.
Crucially, the reverse is not the case when color is the distinguishing dimension. Consider the
speaker in the same context wanting to communicate the big red pin. The two best utterances
for this purpose are red (.57) and big red (.52). In contrast to the results for the small blue pin,
the redundant utterance does not increase the literal listener probability of inferring the intended
referent. The reason for this is that we defined color to be almost noiseless, with the result that
the literal listener distributions in response to utterances containing color terms are more similar
to those obtained via a Boolean semantics than the distributions obtained in response to utter-
ances containing size terms. The reader is encouraged to verify this by comparing the row-wise
distributions under the Boolean and continuous semantics in Table 2.
To better understand the consequences of continuous meanings in contexts like that depicted
in Figure 1a, we visualize the results of varying xsize and xcolor in Figure 4. The deterministic
Boolean semantics of utterances is approximated where the semantic values of both size and color
utterances are close to 1 (.999, top right-most point in graph). In this case, the simple sufficient
(small pin) and complex redundant utterance (small blue pin) are equally likely because they
are both equally informative and utterances are assumed to have 0 cost. All other utterances
are highly unlikely. The interesting question is under which circumstances, if any, the standard
color-size asymmetry emerges. This asymmetry is found in the warmer region of the ‘small blue’
facet, characterized by values of xsize that are lower than xcolor, with high values for xcolor. That
is, redundant utterances are more likely than sufficient utterances when the redundant dimension
(in this case color) is less noisy than the sufficient dimension (in this case size) and overall is
close to noiseless. Thus, when size adjectives are noisier than color adjectives, the model produces
overinformative referring expressions with color, but not with size – precisely the pattern observed
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Figure 4: Probability of producing sufficient small pin, insufficient blue pin, and redundant small
blue pin in contexts as depicted in Figure 1a, as a function of semantic value of color and size
utterances (for βi = 30 and βc = 0). For a visualization of model behavior under varying βi, see
Appendix A.
in the literature (Pechmann, 1989; Gatt et al., 2011). Note also that no difference in adjective
cost is necessary for obtaining the overinformativeness asymmetry, though assuming a greater cost
for size than for color does further increase the observed asymmetry (see Section 3.3 for further
discussion).
2.2.2 Simulation 2: scene variation
In the previous section, we showed that extending RSA with continuous adjective semantics gives
rise to color-size asymmetries when the semantics of color adjectives is closer to deterministic
Boolean truth-functions than size adjectives. When modifiers are noisy, adding ‘stricter’ modifiers
adds information. From this perspective, these additional modifiers are not over informative; they
are usefully redundant given the needs of the listener. Next, we show how the same mechanism
accounts for why increased scene variation increases the probability that referring expressions are
overmodified with color.
Koolen et al. (2013) quantified scene variation as the number of feature dimensions along which
pieces of furniture in a scene varied: type (e.g., chair, fan), size (big, small), and color (e.g., red,
blue).15 Scene variation was manipulated across two experiments, which differed in the dimension
necessary for unique reference (color was always redundant). In Exp. 1, only type was necessary
(fan and couch in the low and high variation conditions in Figure 5a, respectively). In Exp. 2,
15They also included orientation (left-facing, right-facing) as a dimension along which objects could vary in certain
cases. We ignore this dimension here for the sake of simplicity.
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(a) Contexts from Koolen et al. (2013)’s low variation
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(b) Predicted probability of redundant color utter-
ance in Koolen et al. (2013) conditions for βi = 30,
βc = c(usize) = c(ucolor) = 1, xsize = .8, xcolor = .999,
xtype = .9.
Figure 5: Visual contexts employed in experiments by Koolen et al. (2013) alongside RSA model
predictions for the use of redundant modifiers in those contexts.
size and type were necessary (big chair and small chair in Figure 5a, respectively). Across both
experiments, lower rates of redundant color use were found in the low variation conditions (4% and
9%) than in the high variation conditions (24% and 18%). Here, we use simulations to explore the
predictions that continuous semantics RSA – henceforth cs-RSA – makes for these situations.
Following Koolen et al. (2013), we considered any mention of color as a redundant mention. In
Exp. 1, this includes the simple redundant utterances like blue couch as well as complex redundant
utterances like small blue couch. In Exp. 2, where size was necessary for unique reference, only the
complex redundant utterance small brown chair was truly redundant (brown chair was insufficient,
but still included in counts of color mention). Because object type was a distinguishing dimension,
we introduce an additional semantic value xtype, which encodes how noisy nouns are. The results
of simulating these conditions with parameters βi = 30, βc = c(usize) = c(ucolor) = 1, xsize = .8,
xcolor = .999, and xtype = .9 are shown in Figure 5b, under the assumption that the cost of
a two-word utterance c(u) is the sum of the costs of the one-word sub-utterances.16 For both
experiments, the model exhibits the empirically-observed qualitative effect of variation on the
probability of redundant color mention: when variation is greater, redundant color mention is more
likely. Indeed, this effect of scene variation is predicted by the model anytime the semantic values
for size, type, and color are ordered as: xsize ≤ xtype < xcolor. If, on the other hand, xtype is greater
16These parameter values were chosen merely for convenience in illustrating the qualitative model predictions. We
reused values from the previous example, where possible, but also included a cost per word.
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than xcolor, the probability of redundantly mentioning color is close to zero and does not differ
between variation conditions (in those cases, color mention reduces, rather than adds, information
about the target).
To further explore the scene variation effect predicted by RSA, we turn again to Figure 1a.
Here, the target item is the small blue pin and there are two distractor items: a big blue pin and a
big red pin. Thus, for the purpose of establishing unique reference, size is the sufficient dimension
and color the insufficient dimension. We can measure scene variation as the proportion of distractor
items that do not share the value of the insufficient feature with the target, that is, as the number
of distractors ndiff that differ in the value of the insufficient feature divided by the total number of
distractors ntotal:
scene variation =
ndiff
ntotal
In Figure 1a, there is one distractor that differs from the target in color (the big red pin) and there
are two distractors in total. Thus, scene variation = 12 = .5. In general, this measure of scene
variation is minimal when all distractors are of the same color as the target, in which case it is
0. Scene variation is maximal when all distractors except for one (in order for the dimension to
remain insufficient for establishing reference) are of a different color than the target. That is, scene
variation may take on values between 0 and ntotal−1ntotal .
17
Using the same parameter values as above, we generate model predictions for size-sufficient
and color-sufficient contexts, manipulating scene variation by varying number of distractors (2,
3, or 4) and number of distractors that don’t share the insufficient feature value. The resulting
model predictions are shown in Figure 6. The predicted probability of redundant adjective use is
largely (though not completely) correlated with scene variation. Redundant adjective use increases
with increasing scene variation when size is sufficient (and color redundant), but not when color
is sufficient (and size redundant). The latter prediction depends, however, on the actual semantic
value of color—with slightly lower semantic values for color, the model predicts small increases in
17Some readers might find this unintuitive: shouldn’t scene variation be maximal when there is an equal number
of same and different colors? Or when the different colors are also all different from one another? As discussed in
Section 1.2, there are many ways of quantifying (different aspects of) scene variation. We choose to explore this
aspect of variation here as a reasonable first step; RSA makes predictions for other kinds of variation that would be
equally straightforward to test.
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Figure 6: Predicted probability of redundant utterance (small blue pin) as a function of scene
variation when size is sufficient (and color redundant, left) and when color is sufficient (and size
redundant, right), for βi = 30, βc = c(usize) = c(ucolor) = 1, xsize = .8, xcolor = .999. Linear
smoothers overlaid.
redundant size use. In general: increased scene variation is predicted to lead to a greater increase
in redundant adjective use for less noisy adjectives.
RSA with a continuous semantics thus captures the qualitative effects of color-size asymmetry
and scene variation in production of redundant expressions, and it makes quantitative predictions
for both. Testing these quantitative predictions, however, will require more data. In the remainder
of the paper, we quantitatively evaluate cs-RSA on new datasets capturing the phenomena described
in the Introduction (Table 1): modifier type and scene variation effects on modified referring
expressions, typicality effects on color mention, and the choice of taxonomic level of reference in
nominal choice.
3 Experiment 1: size and color modifiers under different scene
variation conditions
Adequately assessing the explanatory value of RSA with continuous semantics requires evaluating
how well it does at predicting the probability of various types of utterances occurring in large
datasets of naturally produced referring expressions. While we showed in Section 2.2.2 that cs-RSA
qualitatively predicts the pattern of overmodification under scene variation, we now test the model’s
quantitative predictions more rigorously in an interactive web-based reference game paradigm. We
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then perform a Bayesian data analysis to both assess how likely the model is to generate the
observed data – i.e., to obtain a measure of model quality – and to explore the posterior distribution
of parameter values – i.e., to understand whether the asymmetries in adjectives’ semantic values
and/or costs explored in the previous section are validated by the data.
3.1 Method
Participants We recruited 58 pairs of participants (116 participants total) over Amazon’s Me-
chanical Turk who were each paid $1.75 for their participation.18 Data from another 7 pairs who
prematurely dropped out of the experiment and who could therefore not be compensated for their
work, were also included. Here and in all other experiments reported in this paper, participants’
IP address was limited to US addresses and only participants with a past work approval rate of at
least 95% were accepted.
Procedure Participants were paired up through a real-time multi-player interface (Hawkins,
2015). One participant was assigned the speaker role and one the listener role. Before continuing
to the experiment, participants were required to correctly answer a series of questions about the
experimental procedure (see Appendix B). On each trial, both participants saw the same array of
objects in independently randomized locations. One of these objects was privately designated as
the target object to the speaker, and marked by a thick border (see Figure 7). The speaker’s task
was to use an unrestricted chat box to send a message communicating the target to the listener, who
subsequently clicked an object to make a response. Both participants then received feedback about
whether the intended referent was selected and advanced to the next trial. They were explicitly
told that using locative modifiers (like left or right) would be useless because the order of objects
on their partner’s screen would be different than on their own screen. For natural interaction, we
allowed both speakers and listeners to write freely in the chat window at any point, but listeners
could only click on an object to advance to the next trial after the speaker sent an initial message.
At the end of the experiments, participants completed a questionnaire in which they indicated
whether their native language was English, whether they thought their partner was human, and
how much they liked their partner.
18We aim to pay Mechanical Turk workers at a rate of $12 - $14.
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(a) Speaker’s perspective. (b) Listener’s perspective.
Figure 7: Example displays from the (a) speaker’s and the (b) listener’s perspective on a size-
sufficient 4-2 trial.
Materials Participants proceeded through 72 trials. Of these, half were critical trials of interest
and half were filler trials. On critical trials, we varied which feature was sufficient for uniquely
establishing reference, the total number of objects in the array, and the number of objects that
shared the insufficient feature with the target.
Objects varied in color and size. On 18 trials, color was sufficient for establishing reference.
On the other 18 trials, size was sufficient. Figure 7 shows an example of a size-sufficient trial. We
further varied the amount of variation in the scene by varying the number of distractor objects in
each array (2, 3, or 4) and the number of distractors that did share the redundant feature value
with the target. That is, when size was sufficient, we varied the number of distractors that shared
the same color as the target. This number had to be at least one, since otherwise the redundant
property would have been sufficient for uniquely establishing reference, i.e. mentioning it would
not have been redundant. Each total number of distractors was crossed with each possible number
of distractors that shared the redundant property, leading to the following nine conditions: 2-1,
2-2, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4, where the first number indicates the total number and
the second number the shared number of distractors. Each condition occurred twice with each
sufficient dimension. Objects never differed in type within one array (e.g., all objects are pins in
Figure 7) but always differed in type across trials. Each object type could occur in two different
sizes and two different colors. We used photo-realistic objects of intuitively fairly typical colors.
The 36 different object types and the colors they could occur with are listed in Appendix C.
Fillers were target trials from Exp. 2, a replication of Graf, Degen, Hawkins, and Goodman
(2016). Each filler item contained a three-object grid. None of the filler objects occurred on target
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trials. Objects stood in various taxonomic relations to each other and required neither size nor
color mention for unique reference. See Section 5 for a description of these materials.
Data pre-processing and exclusion We collected data from 2177 critical trials. Because we
did not restrict participants’ utterances in any way, they produced many different kinds of referring
expressions. Testing the model’s predictions required, for each trial, classifying the produced utter-
ance as an instance of a color -only mention (e.g., blue pin), a size-only mention (e.g., big pin), or a
redundant color-and-size mention (e.g., big blue pin). To this end we applied a semi-automatic data
pre-processing procedure in which a script first checked whether the speaker’s utterance contained
a color or size term. In a second step, one of the authors (CG) manually checked and, if necessary,
corrected the automatic classification. If no classification was possible, the trial was excluded. Af-
ter exclusions, 2076 cases entered the analysis. See Appendix D for details on the pre-processing
procedure.
3.2 Behavioral results
Proportions of redundant color-and-size utterances are shown in Figure 8 alongside model predic-
tions (to be explained further in Section 3.3). There are three main questions of interest: first, do
we replicate the color/size asymmetry in probability of redundant adjective use? Second, do we
replicate the previously established effect of increased redundant color use with increasing scene
variation? Third, is there an effect of scene variation on redundant size use and if so, is it smaller
compared to that on color use, as is predicted under asymmetric semantic values for color and size
adjectives?
We addressed all of these questions by conducting a single mixed effects logistic regression
analysis predicting redundant over minimal adjective use from fixed effects of sufficient property
(color vs. size), scene variation (proportion of distractors that do not share the insufficient property
value with the target), and the interaction between the two.19 All predictors were centered before
entering the analysis. The model included the most sophisticated random effects structure that
allowed the model to converge: by-speaker and by-item random intercepts.
19All mixed effects analyses reported in this paper were conducted with the lme4 package (Bates, Ma¨chler, Bolker,
& Walker, 2015) in R (R Core Team, 2017).
USEFULLY REDUNDANT REFERRING EXPRESSIONS 23
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
color redundant size redundant
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Scene variationP
ro
ba
bi
lity
 o
f r
ed
un
da
nt
 m
od
ifie
r
Data
l
l
empirical
model
Number of
distractors
l 2
3
4
Figure 8: Empirical redundant utterance proportions (orange) alongside point-wise maximum a
posteriori (MAP) estimates of the RSA model’s posterior predictives for redundant utterance prob-
ability (blue) as a function of scene variation in the color redundant (left) and size redundant
(right) condition. Here and in all following plots, error bars indicate 95% bootstrapped confidence
intervals.
We observed a main effect of sufficient property, such that speakers were more likely to re-
dundantly use color than size adjectives (β = 3.54, SE = .22, p < .0001), replicating the much-
documented color-size asymmetry. We further observed a main effect of scene variation, such that
redundant adjective use increased with increasing scene variation (β = 4.62, SE = .38, p < .0001).
Finally, we also observed a significant interaction between sufficient property and scene variation
(β = 2.26, SE = .74, p < .003). Simple effects analysis revealed that the interaction was driven
by the scene variation effect being smaller in the color-sufficient condition (β = 3.49, SE = .65,
p < .0001) than in the size-sufficient condition (β = 5.75, SE = .38, p < .0001), as predicted if
size modifiers are noisier than color modifiers. That is, while the color-sufficient condition indeed
showed a scene variation effect—and as far as we know, this is the first demonstration of an effect
of scene variation on redundant size use—this effect was tiny compared to that of the size-sufficient
condition.20
20In order to address convergence issues with lmer when specifying the maximal random effects structure – i.e.,
by-speaker and by-item random intercepts and slopes for all fixed effects and their interactions – we ran a Bayesian
binomial mixed effects model with weakly informative priors using the brms package (Bu¨rkner, 2017) that included
the same fixed effects structure as the lmer model and the maximal random effects structure. The results were
qualitatively identical, yielding evidence for main effects of redundant feature (posterior mean β = 5.91, 95% CI =
[4.15,8.10], p(β > 0) = .98), scene variation (posterior mean β = 6.18, 95% CI = [4.30,8.24], p(β > 0) = 1), and their
interaction (posterior mean β = 3.31, 95% CI = [-0.54,7.23], p(β > 0) = .96).
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3.3 Model evaluation
In order to evaluate RSA with continuous semantics we conducted a Bayesian data analysis. This
allowed us to simultaneously generate model predictions and infer likely parameter values, by con-
ditioning on the observed production data (coded into size, color, and size-and-color utterances
as described above) and integrating over the five free parameters. To allow for differential costs
for size and color, we introduce separate cost weights (βc(size), βc(color)) applying to size and color
mentions, respectively, in addition to semantic values for color and size (xcolor, xsize) and an infor-
mativeness parameter βi. We assumed uniform priors for each parameter: xcolor, xsize ∼ U(0, 1),
βc(size), βc(color) ∼ U(0, 40), βi ∼ U(0, 40). Inference for the cognitive model was exact. We used
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) with a burn-in of 10000 and lag of 10 to draw 2000 samples
from the joint posteriors on the five free parameters.
Point-wise maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimates of the model’s posterior predictives for just
redundant utterance probabilities are shown alongside the empirical data in Figure 8. In addition,
MAP estimates of the model’s posterior predictives for each combination of utterance, sufficient
dimension, number of distractors, and number of different distractors (collapsing across different
items) are plotted against all empirical utterance proportions in Figure 9. At this level, the model
achieves a correlation of r = .99. Looking at results additionally on the by-item level yields a
correlation of r = .85 (this correlation is expected to be lower both because each item contains less
data, and because we did not provide the model any means to refer differently to, e.g., combs and
pins). The model thus does a very good job of capturing the quantitative patterns in the data.
Posteriors over parameters are shown in Figure 10. Crucially, the semantic value of color is
inferred to be higher than that of size – there is no overlap between the 95% highest density
intervals (HDIs) for the two parameters. That is, size modifiers are inferred to be noisier than
color modifiers. The high inferred βi (MAP βi = 31.4, HDI = [30.7,34.5]) suggests that this
difference in semantic value contributes substantially to the observed color-size asymmetries in
redundant adjective use and that speakers are maximizing quite strongly. As for cost, there is a lot
of overlap in the inferred weights of size and color modifiers, which are both skewed very close to
zero, suggesting that a cost difference (or indeed any cost at all) is neither necessary to obtain the
color-size asymmetry and the scene variation effects, nor justified by the data. Recall further that
we already showed in Section 2.2 that the color-size asymmetry in redundant adjective use requires
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Figure 9: Scatterplot of empirical utterance proportions against point-wise maximum a posteriori
(MAP) estimates of the RSA model’s posterior predictives. Each dot represents a condition mean.
an asymmetry in semantic value and cannot be reduced to cost differences. An asymmetry in cost
only serves to further enhance the asymmetry brought about by the asymmetry in semantic value,
but cannot carry the redundant use asymmetry on its own.
3.4 Discussion
In this section we reported a new dataset of freely produced referring expressions that replicated
the well-documented color-size asymmetry in redundant adjective use, the effect of scene variation
on redundant color use, and showed a novel effect of scene variation on redundant size use. We also
showed that cs-RSA provides an excellent fit to these data. In particular, the crucial element in
obtaining the color-size asymmetry in overmodification is that size adjectives be noisier than color
adjectives, captured in RSA via a lower semantic value for size compared to color. The effect is
that color adjectives are more informative than size adjectives when controlling for the number of
distractors that each would rule out under a Boolean semantics. Asymmetries in the cost of the
adjectives were not attested, and would only serve to further enhance the modification asymmetry
resulting from the asymmetry in semantic value. In addition, we showed that asymmetric effects
of scene variation on overmodification straightforwardly fall out of cs-RSA: scene variation leads to
a greater increase in overmodification with less noisy modifiers because these modifiers (colors) on
average provide more information about the target.
While we defer a broader discussion of the possible psychological and linguistic interpretations
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Figure 10: Posterior model parameter distributions for semantic value (left column) and cost (right
column), separately for color (top row) and size (bottom row) modifiers. Maximum a posteriori
(MAP) xsize = 0.79, 95% highest density interval (HDI) = [0.76,0.80]; MAP xcolor = 0.88, HDI =
[0.85,0.92]; MAP βc(size) = .02, HDI = [0, 0.26]; MAP βc(color) = 0.03, HDI = [0,0.45].
of continuous semantic values to the General Discussion in Section 6, it is worth reflecting on
why size adjectives may be inherently noisier than color adjectives. Color adjectives are typically
treated as absolute adjectives while size adjectives are inherently relative (Pechmann, 1989; Kennedy
& McNally, 2005). That is, while both size and color adjectives are vague, size adjectives are
arguably context-dependent in a way that color adjectives are not – whether an object is big
depends inherently on its comparison class; whether an object is red does not.21 In addition, color
as a property has been claimed to be inherently salient in a way that size is not (Arts et al., 2011;
van Gompel et al., 2019). Finally, color adjectives are rated as less subjective than size adjectives
(Scontras, Degen, & Goodman, 2017). All of this evidence suggests that the use of size adjectives
may be more likely to vary across speakers and contexts than color.
Critically, our explanation of these phenomena departs from those offered by previous theories.
Pechmann (1989) was the first to take the color-size asymmetry as evidence for speakers following
an incremental strategy of object naming. That is, speakers initially start to articulate an adjec-
21This is not entirely true, as has been repeatedly pointed out (e.g., Cohen & Murphy, 1984): red hair has a very
different color than red wine, which in turn has a different color from a red bell pepper. If presented out of context,
only the last red is likely to be judged as red. For discussion of the complex semantics of color terms, see Kennedy
& Mcnally, 2010; Rothschild & Segal, 2009; Szabo, 2001. For our purposes, it suffices that one can give a color
judgment but not a size judgment for an object presented in isolation.
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tive denoting a feature that listeners can quickly and easily recognize (i.e., color) before they have
fully inspected the display and extracted the sufficient dimension. Another explanation appeals
to saliency considerations: speakers may produce modifiers that denote features that are reason-
ably easy for the listener to perceive, so that, even when a feature is not fully distinguishing in
context, it at least serves to restrict the number of objects that could plausibly be considered the
target. Indeed, there has been some support for the idea that overmodification can be beneficial to
listeners by facilitating target identification (Arts et al., 2011; Rubio-Fernandez, 2016; Paraboni,
van Deemter, & Masthoff, 2007). The effect of scene variation on propensity to overmodify has
typically been explained as the result of the demands imposed on visual search: in low-variation
scenes, it is easier to discern the discriminating dimensions than in high-variation scenes, where it
may be easier to simply start naming features of the target that are salient (Koolen et al., 2013).
Finally, there have been various attempts to capture the color-size asymmetry in computational
natural language generation models. The earliest contenders for models of definite referring ex-
pressions like the Full Brevity algorithm (Dale, 1989) or the Greedy algorithm (Dale, 1989) focused
only on discriminatory value – that is, an utterance’s informativeness – in generating referring
expressions. This is equivalent to the very simple interpretation of Grice’s Quantity maxim, and
consequently these models demonstrated the same inability to capture the color-size asymmetry:
they only produced the minimally specified expressions. Subsequently, the Incremental algorithm
(Dale & Reiter, 1995) incorporated a preference order on features, with color ranked higher than
size. The order is traversed and each encountered feature included in the expression if it serves
to exclude at least one further distractor. This results in the production of overinformative color
but not size adjectives. However, the resulting asymmetry is much greater than that evident in
human speakers, and is deterministic rather than exhibiting the probabilistic production patterns
that human speakers exhibit.
More recently, the PRO model (van Gompel et al., 2019) has sought to integrate the observation
that speakers seem to have a preference for including color terms with the observation that a
preference does not imply the deterministic inclusion of said color term. In PRO, the uniquely
distinguishing property (if there is one) is first selected deterministically. In additional steps,
additional properties are added probabilistically, depending on both a salience parameter associated
with the additional property and a parameter capturing speakers’ eagerness to overmodify. If both
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properties are uniquely distinguishing, a property is selected probabilistically depending on its
associated salience parameter. The second step proceeds as before. This model successfully captures
speakers’ overmodification patterns in contexts with one target and two distractors, in the choice
of two properties (color, size) and three properties (color, size, border presence). While the PRO
model – the most state-of-the-art computational model of human production of modified referring
expressions – can capture the basic color-size asymmetry, it does not straightforwardly account for
the more subtle systematicity with which the preference to overmodify with color changes based
on scene variation or object typicality, which we turn to next.
4 Experiment 2: color typicality in modified referring expressions
Our modeling results in Experiment 1 raise interesting questions regarding the status of the inferred
semantic values: do color modifiers have inherently higher semantic values than size modifiers? Is
the difference constant? What if the color modifier is a less well known one like mauve? The way we
have formulated the model thus far, there would indeed be no difference in semantic value between
red and mauve. Moreover, the model is not equipped to handle potential object-level idiosyncracies
such as the typicality effects discussed in Section 1.2: speakers are more likely to redundantly
produce modifiers that denote atypical rather than typical object features, i.e., they are more likely
to refer to a blue banana as a blue banana rather than as a banana, and they are more likely to
refer to a yellow banana as a banana than as a yellow banana (Sedivy, 2003; Westerbeek et al.,
2015).
A natural first step toward explaining typicality effects is to introduce a more nuanced semantics
for nouns in our model. In particular, we could imagine a continuous semantics in which banana
fits better (i.e. has a semantic value closer to 1 for) the yellow banana than the brown, and fits the
brown better than the blue; specific such hypothetical values are shown in the first row of Table
4. Let us further assume that modifying the noun with a color adjective leads to uniformly high
semantic values close to 1 for those objects that a simple truth-conditional semantics would return
‘true’ for (see diagonal in Table 4) and a very low semantic value close to 0 for any utterance applied
to any object that a simple truth-conditional semantics would return ‘false’ for.
The effect of running the speaker model forward with the standard literal listener treatment
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Table 4: Hypothetical semantic values for utterances (rows) as applied to objects (columns). Values
where a Boolean semantics would return ‘true’ are bolded.
yellow banana brown banana blue banana other
banana .9 .35 .1 .01
yellow banana .99 .01 .01 .01
brown banana .01 .99 .01 .01
blue banana .01 .01 .99 .01
other .01 .01 .01 .99
(a) Typical color. (b) Mid-typical color. (c) Atypical color.
Figure 11: Three hypothetical contexts where color is redundant for referring to the target banana.
Banana varies in typicality from left to right. Each context contains one distractor of the same
color as the target, and one of a different color.
of the values in Table 4 for the three contexts in Figure 11, where banana is the strictly sufficient
utterance for unique reference (i.e., color is redundant under the standard view) is as follows: with
βi = 12 and βc = 5,
22 the resulting speaker probabilities for the minimal utterance banana are .95,
.29, and .04, to refer to the yellow banana, the brown banana, and the blue banana, respectively.
In contrast, the resulting speaker probabilities for the redundant yellow banana, brown banana, and
blue banana are .05, .71, and .96, respectively. That is, redundant color mention increases with
decreasing semantic value of the simple banana utterance.
This shows that cs-RSA can predict typicality effects if the semantic fit of the noun (and hence
also of color-noun compounds) to an object is modulated by typicality. The reason the typicality
effect arises is that, with the hypothetical values we assumed, the gain in informativeness between
using the unmodified banana and the modified COLOR banana is greater in the blue than in the
yellow banana case.
This example is somewhat oversimplified. In practice, speakers sometimes mention an object’s
color without mentioning the noun. In the contexts presented in Figure 11 this does not make much
sense because there is always a competitor of the same color present. In contrast, in the contexts
22The results hold qualitatively for any informativeness weight > 1 and any cost weight > 0.
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in Figure 12a and Figure 12c, color alone disambiguates the target. This suggests that we should
consider among the set of utterance alternatives not just the simple type mentions (e.g., banana)
and color-and-type mentions (e.g., yellow banana), but also simple color mentions (e.g., yellow).
The dynamics of the model proceed as before.
An additional, more theoretically fraught, simplification concerns where typicality can enter into
the semantics and how compositions proceeds. In the above, we have assumed that the semantic
value of the modified expression is uniformly high, which is qualitatively what is necessary (and,
as we will see below, empirically correct) in order for the typicality effects to emerge. However,
there is no straightforward way to compositionally derive such uniformly high values from the
semantic values of the nouns and the semantic values of the color modifiers, which we have not yet
discussed. Indeed, compositional semantics of graded meanings is a well known problem for theories
of modification (Kamp & Partee, 1995; Osherson & Smith, 1981). Rather than try to solve it here,
we note that RSA works at the level of whole utterances. Hence, if we can reasonably measure
the semantic fit of each utterance to each possible referent, then cs-RSA will make predictions
for production without the need to derive the semantic values compositionally. That is, if we can
measure the typicality of the phrase blue banana for a banana, we don’t need to derive it from blue,
banana, and a theory of composition. This separates pragmatic aspects of reference, which are the
topic of this paper, from issues in compositional semantics, which are not; hence we will take this
approach for experimentally testing the predictions of relaxed semantics RSA for typicality effects.
The stimuli for Exp. 1 were specifically designed to be realistic objects with low color-diagnosticity,
so they did not include objects with low typicality values or large degrees of variation in typical-
ity. This makes the dataset from Exp. 1 not well-suited for investigating typicality effects.23 We
therefore conducted a separate production experiment in the same paradigm but with two broad
changes: first, objects’ color varied in typicality; and second, we did not manipulate object size,
focusing only on color mention. This allows us to ask three questions: first, do we replicate the
typicality effects reported in the literature – that is, are less color-typical objects more likely to
lead to redundant color use than more color-typical objects? Second, does cs-RSA with empirically
elicited typicality values as proxy for a continuous semantics capture speakers’ behavior? Third,
23We did elicit typicality norms for the items in Exp. 1 and replicated the previously documented typicality effects
on the four items that did exhibit variation in typicality. See Appendix E for details.
USEFULLY REDUNDANT REFERRING EXPRESSIONS 31
does the semantic value depend only on typicality, or is there still a role for modifier type noise
of the kind we investigated in the previous section? In addition, we can investigate the extent to
which utterance cost, which we found not to play a role in the previous section, affects the choice
of referring expression.
4.1 Method
Participants We recruited 61 pairs of participants (122 participants total) over Amazon’s Me-
chanical Turk who were each paid $1.70 for their participation.
Procedure The procedure of the reference game was identical to that of Exp. 1.
Materials Each participant completed 42 trials. In this experiment, there were no filler trials,
since pilot studies with and without fillers delivered very similar results. Each array presented to
the participants consisted of three objects that could differ in type and color. One of the three
objects functioned as a target and the other two as its distractors.
The stimuli were selected from seven color-diagnostic food items (apple, avocado, banana,
carrot, pear, pepper, tomato), which all occurred in a typical, mid-typical and atypical color for
that object. For example, the banana appeared in the colors yellow (typical), brown (midtypical),
and blue (atypical). All items were presented as targets and as distractors. Pepper additionally
occurred in a fourth color, which only functioned as a distractor due to the need for a green color
competitor (as explained in the following paragraph).
We refer to the different context conditions as “informative”, “informative-cc”, “overinforma-
tive”, and “overinformative-cc” (see Figure 12). A context was “overinformative” (Figure 12c)
when mentioning the type of the item, e.g., banana, was sufficient for unambiguously identifying
the target. In this condition, the target never had a color competitor. This means that mentioning
color alone (without a noun) was also unambiguously identifying. In contrast, in the overinfor-
mative condition with a color competitor (“overinformative-cc”, Figure 12d), color alone was not
sufficient. In the informative conditions, color and type mention were necessary for unambiguous
reference. Again, one context type did (Figure 12a) and one did not (Figure 12d) include a color
competitor among its distractors.
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(a) informative (without color competitor) (b) informative-cc (with color competitor)
(c) overinformative (without color competitor) (d) overinformative-cc (with color competitor)
Figure 12: Examples of the four different context conditions in Exp. 2. They differed in the presence
of an object of the same type (informative vs. overinformative) and in the presence of another object
of the same color as the target (with color competitor vs. without color competitor). The thick
border marks the intended referent.
Each participant saw 42 different contexts. Each of the 21 items (color-type combinations) was
the target exactly twice, but the context in which they occurred was drawn randomly from the
four possible conditions mentioned above. In total, there were 84 different possible configurations
(seven target food items, each of them in three colors, where each could occur in four contexts).
Trial order was randomized.
Data pre-processing and exclusion We collected data from 1974 trials. The utterance pro-
duced on each trial was classified as belonging to one of the following categories: type-only (e.g.,
banana), color-and-type (e.g., yellow banana), and color-only (e.g., yellow). Referring expressions
that could not be classified were excluded. See Appendix D for further details on exclusion criteria
and the data pre-processing procedure. Overall, 1827 utterances entered the analysis.
4.2 Typicality norming
In order to test for typicality effects on the production data and to evaluate cs-RSA’s performance,
we collected empirical typicality values for each utterance/object pair in three separate studies.
The first study collected typicalities for color-and-type/object pairs (e.g., yellow banana as applied
to a yellow banana, a blue banana, an orange pear, etc., see Figure 13a). The second study collected
typicalities for type-only/object pairs (e.g., banana as applied to a yellow banana, a blue banana,
an orange pear, etc., Figure 13b). The third study collected typicalities for color/color pairs (e.g.,
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(a) color-and-type norming. (b) type-only norming. (c) color-only norming.
Figure 13: Example stimuli exemplifying the three different typicality norming studies.
Utterances Example Images Participants Trials Items Excluded participants
Adj Noun yellow banana object 174 110 484 14
Noun banana object 75 90 154 1
Adj yellow color patch 110 90 176 None
Table 5: Overview of the typicality norming studies for Exp. 2. Column ‘Items’ contains the number
of unique utterance-object pairs that we elicited responses for.
yellow as applied to a color patch of the average yellow from the yellow banana stimulus or to a
color patch of the average orange from the orange pear stimulus, and so on, for all other colors,
Figure 13c).
On each trial of the type or color-and-type studies, participants saw one of the stimuli used in
the production experiment in isolation and were asked: “How typical is this object for a utterance”,
where utterance was replaced by an utterance of interest. In the color typicality study, they were
asked “How typical is this color for the color color?”, where color was replaced by one of the
relevant color terms. They then adjusted a continuous sliding scale with endpoints labeled “very
atypical” and “very typical” to indicate their response. A summary of the the three typicality
norming studies is shown in Table 5.24
Slider values were coded as falling between 0 (‘very atypical’) and 1 (‘very typical’). For each
24The typicality elicitation procedure we employed here is somewhat different from that employed by Westerbeek
et al. (2015), who asked their participants “How typical is this color for this object?” We did this because the
semantic values that enter into the RSA model are best conceptualized as the typicality of an object as an instance
of an utterance, rather than a feature-category relation. See Appendix E for a comparison of our question and the
Westerbeek question as applied to typicality norms for the items in Exp. 1. In general, the Type-object values are
highly correlated with the Westerbeek question values.
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Table 6: Mean typicalities for banana items. Combinations where Boolean semantics would return
‘true’ are marked in boldface.
Banana items Other
Utterance yellow brown blue
banana .98 .66 .42 .05
yellow banana .97 .30 .15 .05
brown banana .22 .91 .15 .04
blue banana .16 .15 .92 .06
yellow .77 .05 .06 .09
brown .11 .87 .01 .12
blue .06 .06 .92 .07
utterance-object combination, we computed mean typicality ratings. As an example, the means
for the banana items and associated color patches are shown in Table 6. The values exhibit the
same gradient as those hypothesized for the purpose of the example in Table 4. The means for all
items are visualized in Figure 14. Mean typicality values for utterance-object pairs obtained in the
norming studies are used in the analyses and visualizations in the following.
4.3 Behavioral results
Proportions of type-only (banana), color-and-type (yellow banana), color-only (yellow), and other
(funky carrot) utterances are shown in Figure 15a as a function of the described item’s mean
type-only (banana) typicality. Visually inspecting just the explicitly marked yellow banana, brown
banana, and blue banana cases suggests a large typicality effect in the overinformative conditions
as well as a smaller typicality effect in the informative conditions, such that color is less likely to
be produced with increasing typicality of the object.
The following questions are of interest. First, do we replicate the previously documented typ-
icality effect on redundant color mention (as suggested by the visual inspection of the banana
item)? Second, does typicality affect color mention even when color is informative (i.e., technically
necessary for establishing unique reference)? Third, are speakers sensitive to the presence of color
competitors in their use of color or are typicality effects invariant to the distractor items?
To address these questions we conducted a mixed effects logistic regression predicting color
use from fixed effects of typicality, informativeness, and color competitor presence. We used the
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Figure 14: Mean typicality ratings for the three norming studies (type-only, color-only, color-and-
type). The results are categorized according to the objects’ a priori typicality as determined by
the experimenters (yellow banana = typical, brown banana = midtypical, blue banana = atypical).
The category other comprises all utterance-object combinations where a Boolean semantics would
return false (e.g. a pepper). Error bars indicate bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.
typicality norms obtained in the type/object typicality elicitation study reported above (see Figure
13b) as the continuous typicality predictor. The informativeness condition was coded as a binary
variable (color informative vs. color overinformative trial) as was color competitor presence (absent
vs. present). All predictors were centered before entering the analysis. The model included by-
speaker and by-item random intercepts, which was the most sophisticated random effects structure
that allowed the model to converge.
We found a main effect of typicality, such that the more typical an object was for the type-
only utterance, the lower the log odds of color mention (β = -4.17, SE = 0.45, p < .0001),
replicating previously documented typicality effects. Stepwise model comparison revealed that
including interaction terms was not justified by the data, suggesting that speakers produce more
typical colors less often even when the color is in principle necessary for establishing reference (i.e.,
in the informative conditions). This is notable: speakers sometimes call a yellow banana simply a
banana even when other bananas are present, presumably because they can rely on listeners drawing
the inference that they must have meant the most typical banana. In contrast, blue bananas’ color
is always mentioned in the informative conditions.
There was also a main effect of informativeness, such that color mention was less likely when
it was overinformative than when it was informative (β = -5.56, SE = 0.33, p < .0001). Finally,
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(a) Empirical utterance proportions
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(b) MAP model predicted utterance probabilities
Figure 15: (a) Empirical utterance proportions in Exp. 2 and (b) MAP model predicted utterance
probabilities for each target as a function of mean object typicality for the type-only utterance (e.g.,
banana). Color indicates utterance type: type-only (banana), color-only (yellow), color-and-type
(yellow banana), and other (funky carrot). Facets indicate conditions (informative vs. overinfor-
mative, color competitor present (cc) or absent). Modified utterance data points for the banana
items are circled in the banana’s respective color in (a).
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there was a main effect of color competitor presence, such that color mention was more likely when
a color competitor was absent (β = 0.71, SE = 0.16, p < .0001). This suggests that speakers are
indeed sensitive to the contextual utility of color – color typicality alone does not capture the full
set of facts about color mention, as we already saw in Section 3.
4.4 Model evaluation
We evaluated the cs-RSA model on the obtained production data from Exp. 2. In particular, we
were interested in using model comparison to address the following issues: First, can RSA using
elicited typicality as the semantic values account for quantitative details of the production data?
Second, are typicality values sufficient, or is there additional utility in including a noise offset
determined by the type of modifier, as was used in the previous section? Third, does utterance
cost explain any of the observed production behavior.
While the architecture of the model remained the same as that of the model presented in
Section 2.2, we briefly review the minor necessary changes, some of which we already mentioned at
the beginning of this section. These changes concerned the semantic values and the cost function.25
4.4.1 Lexicon
Previously, we considered only three utterance alternatives: color, size, and color-size, collapsing
over the precise values these took on. Here, we no longer collapse over these values, including in the
lexicon each possible color adjective, type noun, and combination of the two. This substantially
increased the size of the lexicon to 37 unique utterances. For each combination of utterance u
and object o that occurred in the experiment, we included a separate semantic value xu,o, elicited
in the norming experiments described in Section 4.2 (rather than inferred as done for Exp. 1, to
avoid overfitting). For any given context, we assumed the utterance alternatives that correspond
to the individually present features and their combinations. For example, for the context in Figure
12d, the set of utterance alternatives was yellow, green, pear, banana, avocado, yellow pear, yellow
banana, and green avocado.
25See Table 8 for an overview of the models reported in the paper.
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4.4.2 Semantics
We compared several choices of semantics for the model. In the full fixed plus empirical semantics
version, we introduced a parameter βfixed interpolating between the empirically elicited typicality
values (βfixed = 0) and the inferred type-level values as employed in Section 3 (βfixed = 1). The
type-level values again consisted of one value for color terms and another for type terms, which
are multiplied when the terms are composed in an utterance. In a lesioned empirical semantics
version, we set βfixed = 0 and only used the empirical values. Conversly, in a lesioned fixed semantics
version, we set βfixed = 1 and only used the inferred type-level values. This allowed us to perform
a nested model comparison, since the latter models are special cases of the first.
4.4.3 Cost function
For the purpose of evaluating the model in Section 3 we inferred two constant costs (one for color
and one for size), and found in the Bayesian Data Analysis that the role of cost in explaining the
data was minimal at best. Here, we compared two different versions of utterance cost. In the fixed
cost model we treated cost the same way as in the previous section and included only a color and
type level cost, inferred from the data. We then compared this model to an empirical cost model,
in which we included a more complex cost function. Specifically, we defined utterance cost c(u) as
follows:
c(u) = βF · p(u) + βL · l(u) (7)
Here, p(u) is negative log utterance frequency, as estimated from the Google Books corpus (years
1950 to 2008); l(u) is the mean empirical length of the utterance in characters in the production
data (e.g., sometimes yellow was abbreviated as yel, leading to an l(u) smaller than 6); βF is a
weight on frequency; and βL is a weight on length. Both p(u) and l(u) were normalized to fall into
the interval [0, 1].26 The empirical cost function thus prefers short and frequent utterances (e.g.,
blue) over long and infrequent ones (turquoise-ish bananaesque thing). We compared both of these
models to a simpler baseline in which utterances were assumed to have no cost.
26Note that we changed the sign on frequency, which means that values closer to 1 in the normalized space reflect
greater cost on both the length and the frequency dimension.
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Table 7: Marginal log likelihood for each model. Best model is in bold. Parentheses indicate
number of free parameters.
Semantics
empirical fixed fixed plus empirical
Cost
empirical -1390.3 (4) -1295.1 (6) -1251.4 (7)
fixed -1350.3 (4) -1272.6 (6) -1238.5 (7)
none -1352.2 (2) -1223.0 (4) -1188.4 (5)
4.4.4 Model comparison
To evaluate the effect of these choices of semantics and cost, we conducted a full Bayesian model
comparison. Specifically, we computed the Bayes Factor for each comparison, a measure quantify-
ing the support for one model over another in terms of the relative likelihood they each assign to
the observed data. As opposed to classical likelihood ratios, which only use the maximum likeli-
hood estimate, the likelihoods in the Bayes Factor integrate over all parameters, thus automatically
correcting for the flexibility due to extra parameters (the “Bayesian Occam’s Razor”). Because it
was intractable to analytically compute these integrals for our recursive model, we used Annealed
Importance Sampling (AIS), a Monte Carlo algorithm commonly used to approximate these quan-
tities. To ensure high-quality estimates, we took the mean over 100 independent samples for each
model, with each chain running for 30,000 steps. The marginal log likelihoods for each model are
shown in Table 7. The best performing model used fixed plus empirical semantics and did not
include a cost term. Despite the greater number of parameters associated with adding the fixed se-
mantics to the empirical semantics, the fixed plus empirical semantics models were preferred across
the board compared to their empirical-only (BF = 3.7× 1048 for fixed costs, BF = 2.1× 1060 for
empirical costs, and BF = 1.4× 1071 for no cost) and fixed-only counterparts (BF = 6.5× 1014 for
fixed costs, BF = 1.0×1019 for empirical costs, and BF = 1.06×1015 for no cost). In comparison,
additional cost-related parameters were not justified, with BF = 5.7 × 1021 for no cost compared
to fixed cost and BF = 2.1× 1027 for compared to empirical cost.
The correlation between empirical utterance proportions and the best model’s MAP predictions
at the by-item level was r = .94. Predictions for the best-performing model are visualized alongside
empirical proportions in Figure 15b. The model successfully reproduces the empirically observed
typicality effects in all four experimental conditions, with a reasonably good quantitative agreement.
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Figure 16: For best model, posterior model parameter distributions for interpolation weight on
fixed vs. empirical semantics βfixed, informativity weight βi, typicality weight βt, and utterance
type level semantic values for color xcolor and type xtype. Maximum a posteriori (MAP) βfixed =
0.69, 95% highest density interval (HDI) = [0.64,0.77]; MAP βi = 13.74, HDI = [11.58,14.37]; MAP
βt = 1.34, HDI = [1.19,1.75]; MAP xcolor = 0.86, HDI = [0.82,0.89]; MAP xtype = 0.998, HDI =
[0.97,1.00].
The interpolation weight between the fixed and empirical semantic values βfixed (Figure 16) is in the
intermediate range: this provides evidence that a noisy truth-conditional semantics as employed
in Exp. 1 is justified, but that taking into account graded category membership or typicality in an
utterance’s final semantic value is also necessary.
There is one major, and interesting, divergence from the empirical data in conditions without
color competitors. Here, color-and-type utterances are systematically somewhat underpredicted
in the informative condition, and systematically somewhat overpredicted in the overinformative
condition. The reverse is true for color-only utterances. It is worth looking at the posterior over
parameters, shown in Figure 16, to understand the pattern. In particular, the utterance type level
semantic value of type is inferred to be systematically higher than that of color, capturing that
type utterances are less noisy than color utterances.27 An increase in color-only mentions in the
overinformative condition could be achieved by reducing the semantic value for type. However,
that would lead to a further and undesirable increase in color-only mentions in the informative
condition as well. That is, the two conditions are in a tug-of-war with each other.
4.5 Discussion
In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that cs-RSA predicts color typicality effects in the production
of referring expressions with only minimal extensions to support finer-grained prediction of item-
by-item data (see Table 8 in the General Discussion for a more extensive comparison of the model
27Interestingly, the inferred semantic value for color is very similar in absolute terms to that in Exp. 1.
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details across sections). This suggests that the dynamics at work in the choice of color vs. size
and in the choice of color as a function of the object’s color typicality are very similar: speakers
choose utterances by considering the fine-grained differences in information about the intended
referent communicated by the ultimately chosen utterance compared to its competitor utterances.
For noisier utterances (e.g., banana as applied to a blue banana), including the ‘overinformative’
color modifier is useful because it provides information. For less noisy utterances (e.g., banana
as applied to a yellow banana), including the color modifier is useless because the unmodified
utterance is already highly informative with respect to the speaker’s intention. These dynamics can
sometimes even result in the color modifier being left out altogether, even when there is another—
very atypical—object of the same type present, simply because the literal listener is expected to
prefer the typical referent strongly enough.
Model comparison demonstrated the need for assuming a semantics that interpolates between a
noisy truth-conditional semantics as employed in Exp. 1 and empirically elicited typicality values.
This may reflect semantic knowledge that goes beyond graded category membership, additional
effects of compositionality, or perhaps simply differences between our empirical typicality measure
and the “semantic fit” expected by RSA models. Perhaps surprisingly, we replicated the result
from Exp. 1 that utterance cost does not add any predictive power, even when quantified via a
more sophisticated cost function that takes into account an utterance’s length and frequency. In
the next section, we move beyond the choice of modifier and ask whether cs-RSA provides a good
account of referring expression production more generally.
5 Experiment 3: taxonomic level in unmodified referring expres-
sions
In this section we investigate whether cs-RSA accounts for referring expression production beyond
the choice of modifier. In particular, we focus on speakers’ choice of taxonomic level of reference in
nominal referring expressions. A particular object can be referred to at its subordinate (dalmatian),
basic (dog), or superordinate (animal) level, among other choices. This choice of reference level
is interestingly different from that of adding modifiers in that there is no additional word-level
cost associated with being more specific – the choice is between different one-word utterances,
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not between utterances differing in word count. Still, we hypothesized that similar factors may
contribute: an expression’s contextual informativeness, its cognitive cost (short and frequent terms
are preferred over long and infrequent ones, Griffin & Bock, 1998; Jescheniak & Levelt, 1994), and
its typicality (an utterance is more likely to be used if the object is a good instance of it, Jolicoeur
et al., 1984).
In order to evaluate cs-RSA for nominal choice, we proceeded as in Section 4: we collected
production data within the same reference game setting, but varied the contextual informativeness
of utterances by varying whether distractors shared the same basic or superordinate category with
the target (see Figure 17). We also elicited typicality ratings for object-utterance combinations,
which entered the model as the semantic values via the lexicon. We then conducted Bayesian data
analysis, as in previous sections, for model comparison. Our key insight is that compared to a
traditional Boolean semantics where class labels (e.g. dog) are strictly true or false of objects, a
continuous semantics incorporating knowledge of typicality more successfully predicts preferences
for taxonomic level of reference. That is, cs-RSA accurately predicts, from Gricean principles, that
speakers will increase their preference for subordinate terms (e.g. penguin) when an object is a
more atypical example of the basic-level (bird) and prefer basic-level terms (e.g. bird) when those
objects are more atypical examples of the super-ordinate level (animal).
5.1 Method
Participants We recruited 58 pairs of participants (116 participants total, the same participants
as in Exp. 1) over Amazon’s Mechanical Turk who were each paid $1.75 for their participation.
Procedure and materials The procedure was identical to that of Exp. 1.28 Participants pro-
ceeded through 72 trials. Of these, half were critical trials of interest and half were filler trials (the
critical trials from Exp. 1). On critical trials, we varied the level of reference that was sufficient to
mention for uniquely establishing reference.
Stimuli were selected from nine distinct domains, each corresponding to distinct basic level
categories such as dog. For each domain, we selected four subcategories to form our target set (e.g.
dalmatian, pug, German Shepherd and husky). See Table 11 in Appendix F for a full list of domains
28A separate earlier data set was reported at the annual meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (Graf et al.,
2016), and serves as a close replication of the reported study.
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(a) subordinate necessary (b) basic sufficient (two superordinate distractors)
(c) basic sufficient (one superordinate distractor) (d) superordinate sufficient
Figure 17: Example contexts in which different levels of reference are necessary for establishing
unique reference to the target marked with a thick border: (a) subordinate necessary (dalmatian);
(b, c) basic sufficient (dog) and subordinate possible (husky, pug); (d) superordinate sufficient
(animal) and basic or subordinate possible (dog, German Shepherd).
and their associated target items. Each domain also contained an additional item which belonged
to the same basic level category as the target (e.g., greyhound) and items which belonged to the
same supercategory but not the same basic level (e.g., elephant or squirrel). The latter items were
used as distractors.
Each trial consisted of a display of three images, one of which was designated as the target
object. Each pair of participants saw each target exactly once, for a total of 36 trials. These target
items were randomly assigned distractor items which were selected from three different context
conditions, corresponding to different communicative pressures (see Figure 17). The subordinate
necessary contexts contained one distractor of the same basic category and one distractor of the
same superordinate category (e.g., target: dalmatian, distractors: greyhound (also a dog) and
squirrel (also an animal)). The basic sufficient contexts contained either two distractors of the same
superordinate category but different basic category as the target (e.g., target: husky, distractors:
hamster and elephant) or one distractor of the same superordinate category and one unrelated item
(e.g., target: pug, distractors: cow and table). The superordinate sufficient contexts contained two
unrelated items (e.g., target: German Shepherd, distractors: shirt and cookie).
This context manipulation served as a manipulation of utterance informativeness: any target
could be referred to at the subordinate (dalmatian), basic (dog) or superordinate (animal) level.
However, the level of reference necessary for uniquely referring differed across contexts.
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Data pre-processing and exclusion We collected data from 2193 critical trials. Each referring
expression was classified as containing the target’s correct sub(ordinate, e.g., dalmatian), basic (e.g.,
dog), or super(ordinate, e.g., animal) level term, or excluded if classification was not possible. See
Appendix D for details on exclusion criteria and the pre-processing procedure. After exclusions
and pre-processing, 1872 cases entered the analysis.
Typicality norming In order to test for typicality effects on the production data and to evaluate
cs-RSA’s performance, we again collected empirical typicality values for each utterance/object pair.
See Appendix G for details.
5.2 Behavioral results and discussion
Proportions of sub, basic, and super level utterances are shown in Figure 18. Overall, super level
mentions are highly dispreferred (< 2%), so we focus in this section only on predictors of sub over
basic level mentions. The clearest pattern of note is that sub level mentions are only preferred in the
most constrained context that necessitates the sub level mention for unique reference (e.g., target:
dalmatian, distractor: greyhound; see Figure 17a). Nevertheless, even in these contexts there is a
non-negligible proportion of basic level mentions (28%). This includes cases of using just the basic
level term (6%, e.g., dog for the German Shepherd when one of the distractors was a greyhound, an
atypical dog, akin to the unmodified cases in the informative conditions discussed in Section 4.3)
as well as basic level terms with additional modifying material (22%). In the remaining contexts,
where the sub and basic level are equally informative, there is a clear preference for the basic level.
Finally, mitigating this context effect, sub level mentions increased with increasing typicality of the
object as an instance of the sub level utterance.
What explains these preferences? In order to test for effects of informativeness, length, fre-
quency, and typicality on nominal choice we conducted a mixed effects logistic regression predicting
sub over basic level mention from centered predictors for the factors of interest. Because the max-
imal model with by-speaker and by-item slopes for all fixed effects did not converge, we simplified
the random effects structure, including only by-speaker and by-item random intercepts.
Frequency was coded as the difference between the sub and the basic level’s log frequency, as
extracted from the Google Books Ngram English corpus ranging from 1960 to 2008. Speakers prefer
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Figure 18: Top: utterance proportions for each target item across different informativeness con-
ditions as a function of the object’s subordinate level typicality. Example target items polo shirt
(basic: shirt, super: clothes), SUV (basic: car, super: vehicle), and parrot (basic: bird, super:
animal) that were characteristic of relatively low to relatively high sub typicality items are labeled
explicitly. Bottom: MAP model predicted utterance probabilities.
more frequent words over less frequent ones (Oldfield & Wingfield, 1965).
Length was coded as the ratio of the subordinate to the basic level term’s length in characters.
Even among one-word utterances, speakers prefer shorter ones over longer ones (Degen et al.,
2013; Rohde et al., 2012). We used the mean number of characters in the utterances participants
produced. For example, the minivan, when referred to at the subcategory level, was sometimes
called “minivan” and sometimes “van” leading to a mean empirical length of 5.71. This is the value
that was used, rather than 7, the length of “minivan”.
Typicality was coded as the ratio of the target’s sub to basic level label typicality.29 That is,
the higher the ratio, the more typical the object was for the sub level label compared to the basic
level; or in other words, a higher ratio indicates that the object was relatively atypical for the basic
label compared to the sub label. For instance, the panda was relatively atypical for its basic level
“bear” (mean rating 0.75) compared to the sub level term “panda bear” (mean rating 0.98), which
29Typicalities were elicited in a separate norming study that was identical in procedure to that of Exp. 1a. See
Appendix G for details about the study.
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resulted in a relatively high typicality ratio. We predicted that subordinate terms may be preferred
when an object is a particularly good instance of that term or a particularly bad instance of the
basic level term, compared to the other objects in the context.
Informativeness condition was coded as a three-level factor: sub necessary, basic sufficient,
and super sufficient, where basic sufficient (two superordinate distractors) and basic sufficient (one
superordinate distractor) were collapsed into basic sufficient. Condition was Helmert-coded: two
contrasts over the three condition levels were included in the model, comparing each level against
the mean of the remaining levels (in order: sub necessary, basic sufficient, super sufficient). This
allowed us to determine whether the probabilities of type mention for neighboring conditions were
significantly different from each other, as suggested by Figure 18.
The log odds of mentioning the sub level term were greater in the sub necessary condition than in
either of the other two conditions (β = 2.11, SE = .17, p < .0001), and greater in the basic sufficient
condition than in the super sufficient condition (β = .60, SE = .15, p < .0001), suggesting that
the contextual informativeness of the sub level mention has a gradient effect on utterance choice.30
There was also a main effect of typicality, such that the sub level term was preferred for objects that
were more typical for the sub level compared to the basic level description (β = 4.82, SE = 1.35,
p < .001). In addition, there was a main effect of length, such that as the length of the sub level
term increased compared to the basic level term (“chihuahua”/“dog” vs. “pug”/“dog”), the sub
level term was dispreferred (“chihuahua” is dispreferred compared to “pug”, β = −.95, SE = .27,
p < .001). The main effect of frequency did not reach significance (β = .08, SE = .11, p < .45).
Unsurprisingly, there was also significant by-participant and by-domain variation in sub level
term mention. For instance, mentioning the sub over the basic level term was preferred more
in some domains (e.g. in the “candy” domain) than in others. Likewise, some domains had a
greater preference for basic level terms (e.g. the “shirt” domain). Using the super term also ranged
from hardly being observable (e.g., plant in the “flower” domain) to being used more frequently
(e.g., furniture in the “table” domain and vehicle in the “car” domain). We thus replicated the
well-documented preference to refer to objects at the basic level, which is partly modulated by
30Importantly, model comparison between the reported model and one that subsumes basic and super under the
same factor level revealed that the three-level condition variable is justified (χ2(1) = 12.82, p < .0004), suggesting
that participants do not simply revert to the basic level when no basic-level distractor is in context.
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contextual informativeness and partly a result of the basic level term’s cognitive cost and typicality
compared to its sub level competitor, mirroring the results from Exp. 2.
Perhaps surprisingly, we did not observe an effect of frequency on sub level term mention.
This is likely due to the modality of the experiment: the current study was a written production
study, while most studies that have identified frequency as a factor governing production choices
are spoken production studies. It may be that the cognitive cost of typing longer words may be
disproportionately higher than that of producing longer words in speech, thus obscuring a potential
effect of frequency. Support for this hypothesis comes from studies comparing written and spoken
language, which has found that spoken descriptions are likely to be longer than written descriptions
and, in English, seem to have a lower propositional information density than written descriptions
(van Miltenburg, Koolen, & Krahmer, 2018).31
5.3 Model evaluation
We evaluated cs-RSA on the production data from Exp. 3. The architecture of the model is
identical to that of the model presented in Section 4.4. The only difference is the set of alternative
utterances.32 Whereas the models from the previous sections treated all individual features and
feature combinations present in the display as utterance alternatives, for computational efficiency we
now consider only the three different levels of reference to the target as alternatives, i.e. subordinate
(dalmatian), basic (dog), and superordinate (animal). So, even when a German Shepherd is present
as a distractor, German Shepherd is not considered an alternative utterance for the dalmatian
target. This has minimal effects on model predictions as long as German Shepherd has low semantic
fit to the dalmatian target.
In Experiment 2, we tested which of three different semantics was most justified – the empiri-
31In order to address convergence issues with lmer when specifying the full random effects structure – i.e., by-
speaker and by-item random intercepts and slopes for all fixed effects – we also ran a Bayesian binomial mixed effects
model with weakly informative priors using the brms package (Bu¨rkner, 2017) that included the same fixed effects
structure as the lmer model and the full random effects structure. The results were qualitatively identical, yielding
evidence for main effects of context (sub vs basic sufficient: posterior mean β = 2.44, 95% CI = [1.87,3.06], p(β > 0)
= 1; basic vs super sufficient: posterior mean β = 0.70, 95% CI = [0.32,1.09], p(β > 0) = 1), typicality (posterior
mean β = 9.96, 95% CI = [3.55,17.51], p(β > 0) = 1), and length (posterior mean β = -1.12, 95% CI = [-2.00,-0.31],
p(β < 0) = 1).
32See Table 8 for an overview of the models reported in the paper.
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Figure 19: Posterior model parameter distributions for interpolation weight on fixed vs. empirical
semantics βfixed, informativity weight βi, typicality weight βt, frequency cost weight βF , and length
cost weight βL. Maximum a posteriori (MAP) βfixed = 0.004, 95% highest density interval (HDI) =
[0.000,0.03]; βi = 19.8, HDI = [17.71,20.0]; MAP βt = 0.57, HDI = [0.53,0.67]; MAP βF = 0.0.02,
HDI = [0.00,0.19]; MAP βL = 2.69, HDI = [2.42,2.99].
cally elicited typicality semantics, a fixed semantics with type-level semantic values, and one that
combined both. Here, the relevant comparison is between a fixed Boolean noun semantics (i.e. 1 if
the object belongs to the given class label, and 0 otherwise) and the empirically elicited typicality
semantics. Again, we introduced a parameter that interpolated between these semantic values.
Additionally, we evaluated which cost function was best supported by the data: the one defined in
(7) (a linear weighted combination of an utterance’s length and its frequency) or a simpler baseline
in which utterances were assumed to have no cost.
We employed the same procedure as in the previous section to compute the Bayes Factor for the
comparison between the two cost models, and to compute the posteriors over parameters. Priors
were again βi ∼ U(0, 20), βF ∼ U(0, 5), βL ∼ U(0, 5), βt ∼ U(0, 5). Despite the greater number of
parameters associated with adding the cost function, the model that includes non-zero costs was
preferred compared to its no-cost counterpart (BF = 2.8 × 1077). Posteriors over parameters are
shown in Figure 19. First, we observe that the semantic interpolation value was highly skewed
toward 0, strongly indicating that empirical typicality values strongly improve model performance
over a Boolean baseline. Second, the weight on frequency is close to zero. That is, in line with
the results from the mixed effects regression, it is an utterance’s length, but not its frequency, that
affects the probability with which it is produced in this paradigm.33
MAP model predictions are shown alongside empirical utterance proportions in Figure 18. The
33As discussed in previous sections, the lack of importance of a word’s frequency may well be attributable to the
written modality within which participants generated referring expressions.
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correlation between empirical utterance proportions and the model’s MAP predictions at the level of
targets, utterances, and conditions was r = .86. Further collapsing across targets yields a correlation
of r = .95. The model captures the qualitative patterns well, though it somewhat overpredicts
subordinate level and underpredicts basic level choices. It also accounts for the strong preference
against super level mentions. The reason for this is that the semantics for each utterance (eg.,
dalmatian, dog, animal) is taken from the empirically elicited typicality values for each utterance-
object pair. As can be seen in the left panel of Figure 24, the target images used in this experiment
were generally rated as less typical instances of the superordinate level term than of the basic
or subordinate level term. This difference is enough to lead to a general bias against using the
superordinate level term, especially when coupled with the fact that superordinate terms tend to
be costlier than basic level terms.
6 General Discussion
In this paper we have provided a unified account of referring expression choice that solves a long-
recognized puzzle for rational theories of language use: why do speakers’ referring expressions often
and systematically exhibit seeming overinformativeness? We have shown here that by allowing con-
textual utterance informativeness to be computed with respect to a continuous (or noisy) rather
than a Boolean semantics, utterances that seem overinformative can in fact be sufficiently informa-
tive. This happens when what seems like the prima facie sufficiently informative utterance is in fact
noisy and may lead a literal listener astray; adding redundancy ensures successful communication.
This simple modification to the Rational Speech Act approach allowed us to capture: the basic
well-documented asymmetry for speakers to be more likely to redundantly use color adjectives than
size adjectives; the interaction between sufficient dimension and scene variation in the probability
of redundancy; and typicality effects in both color modifier choice and noun choice.
We have thus shown that with one key innovation – a continuous semantics – one can retain the
assumption that speakers rationally trade off informativeness and cost of utterances in language
production. Rather than being wastefully overinformative, adding redundant modifiers or refer-
ring at a lower taxonomic level than strictly necessary is in fact appropriately informative. This
innovation thus not only provides a unified explanation for a number of key patterns within the
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overinformative referring expression literature that have thus far eluded a unified explanation; it
also extends to the domain of nominal choice. And in contrast to previously proposed computa-
tional models, it is straightforwardly extendable to any instance of definite referring expressions of
the sort we have examined here.
6.1 Comparison of model components across experiments
In order to address the possible concern that the different models employed are too different from
one another to be comparable, we begin by providing an overview of the parts of the model that
remained the same or differed across experiments. While the core architecture with relaxed se-
mantics remained constant throughout the paper, some peripheral components were adjusted to
accommodate the aims of the different experiments. These different choices are fully consistent
with one another, and many of them were justified against alternatives via model comparison. We
have provided an overview of the best-fitting RSA models for each of the three reported production
datasets in Table 8.
Most prominently, Exps. 2 and 3 aimed to predict patterns of reference via typicality at the
object-level ; in those cases the model thus required semantic values for each utterance-object pair in
the lexicon. While these values could have in principle been inferred from the data, as we inferred
the two type-level values in Exp. 1, it would have introduced a large number of additional parameters
(see size of lexicon). Instead, we addressed this problem by empirically eliciting these values in an
independent task and introducing a single free concentration parameter βt that modulated their
strength. In the case of Exp. 2, we found that the best-fitting model smoothly integrated these
empirical values with type-level values used in Exp. 1.
The need to make object-level predictions also drove decisions about what to use as the cost
function and the set of alternative utterances. For instance, in Exp. 3 we could have inferred the
cost of each noun but this again would have introduced a large number of free parameters and
risked overfitting. Instead we used the empirically estimated length and frequency of each word.
For Exp. 2, we tested models both using fixed costs for each modifier as in Exp. 1 and empirical
length and frequency costs as in Exp. 3, but our model comparison showed that neither sufficiently
improved the model’s predictions.
Finally, the set of alternative utterances differed slightly across the three experiments for com-
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Table 8: Overview of the best-performing models used for the three different production datasets
Color/size (Exp. 1), Color typicality (Exp. 2), and Nominal choice (Exp. 3). Parameter names:
xcolor: semantic value of color; xsize: semantic value of size; βc(color): cost of color; βc(size): cost of
size; βi: weight on informativity; βF : weight on cost (as estimated by utterance frequency); βL:
weight on cost (as estimated by utterance length); βt: weight on elicited typicality values; βfixed:
interpolation weight between fixed type-level and empirical semantic values
Color/size Color typicality Nominal choice
Semantic
values
at type-level (inferred) at type-level (inferred)
+ object-level (elicited)
at object-level (elicited)
Size of
lexicon L(u, o)
8 (all combinations of
size and color)
814 (1 for each utterance-
object pair)
51 (1 for each utterance-
object pair)
Set of
alternatives
8 contextually available
feature combinations
(size, color)
8 or 9 contextually
available feature combi-
nations (type, color)
3 target alternatives
(level of reference: sub,
basic, super)
Cost type-level
(color and size)
none necessary empirical
(length and frequency)
Free
parameters
xcolor, xsize,
βc(color), βc(size), βi
xcolor, xtype,
βi, βt, βfixed
βF , βL, βi, βt
putational reasons. Because Exp. 1 collapsed over the particular levels of size and color, it was
practical to consider all utterances in the lexicon for every target. In Exp. 2 and Exp. 3, however,
the space of possible utterances was large enough that this exhaustive approach became impractical.
We noticed that the probability of using some utterances (e.g. ‘table’ to refer to a Dalmatian) was
low enough that we could prune the utterance space to only those that could plausibly apply to the
objects in context without substantially altering the model’s behavior. Future work must address
how predictions may change as more complex referring expressions outside the scope of this paper
enter the set of alternatives (e.g. the option of combining adjectives with nominal expressions, as
in the cute, spotted dog). In the following we discuss a number of intriguing questions that this
work raises and avenues for future research it suggests.
6.2 Comparison with PRO
While a detailed comparison of cs-RSA with PRO (van Gompel et al., 2019), the hitherto most state-
of-the-art computational model of human production of modified referring expressions, is outside
the scope of this paper, we include some comparative remarks here. PRO has the advantage of
being computationally more efficient than cs-RSA, partly because it aims to be an algorithmic-
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level model, which may be of importance for applications. PRO may further have the advantage
of having fewer parameters, though this is a bit harder to evaluate in general: while PRO as
applied to the choice of color and size in principle involves 2 parameters, s (size preference) and
e (overspecification eagerness), in the 2019 paper the maximum likelihood parameter values are
estimated on each of the experimental conditions separately, effectively resulting in 6 parameters.
In the extension to 3 properties, this results in 14 parameters, and this number increases further
as more properties and conditions are added. If the parameter values had been estimated on all
conditions jointly, which is what we did in the evaluation of cs-RSA instead of separately, then
indeed PRO would have fewer effective parameters than cs-RSA, though it is unclear how this
would affect the data fit.
One advantage of the cs-RSA approach is greater generality. For instance, it is not immediately
clear how PRO should be extended to contexts that vary in the number and nature of distractors,
where empirical overmodification proportions change, but the PRO predictions would not. We
see this as one of the great strengths of cs-RSA: scene variation effects fall out of the model
directly. Finally, we have proposed here a way to account for typicality effects. PRO may be
able to accommodate typicality effects if its preference parameters can be made to be sensitive
to typicality. In general, a systematic comparison and possible combination of these models is an
important next step.
6.3 ‘Overinformativeness’
This work challenges the traditional notion of overinformativeness as it is commonly employed in
the linguistic and psychological literature. The reason that redundant referring expressions are
interesting for psycholinguists to study is that they seem to constitute a clear violation of rational
theories of language production. For example, Grice’s Quantity-2 maxim, which asks of speakers to
“not make [their] contribution more informative than is required” (Grice, 1975), appears violated
by any redundant referring expression – if one feature uniquely distinguishes the target object from
the rest and a second one does not, mentioning the second does not contribute any information
that is not already communicated by the first. Hence, the second is considered ‘overinformative’, a
referring expression that contains it ‘overspecified.’
This conception of (over-)informativeness assumes that all modifiers are born equal – i.e., that
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there are no a priori differences in the utility of mentioning different properties of an object. Under
this conception of modifiers, there are hard lines between modifiers that are and aren’t informative in
a context. However, what we have shown here is that under a continuous semantics, a modifier that
would be regarded as overinformative under the traditional conception may in fact communicate
information about the referent. The more visual variation there is in the scene, and the less noisy
the redundant modifier is compared to the modifier that selects the dimension that uniquely singles
out the target, the more information the redundant modifier adds about the referent, and the more
likely it therefore is to be mentioned. This work thus challenges the traditional notion of utterance
overinformativeness by providing an alternative that captures the quantitative variation observed
in speakers’ production in a principled way while still assuming that speakers are aiming to be
informative, and is compatible with other efficiency-based accounts of ‘overinformative’ referring
expressions (e.g., Sedivy, 2003; Rubio-Fernandez, 2016).
But this raises a question: what counts as a truly overinformative utterance under RSA with
a continuous semantics? Cs-RSA shifts the standard for overinformativeness and turns it into a
graded notion: the less expected the use of a redundant modifier is contextually, the more the
use of that modifier should be considered overinformative. For example, consider again Figure 8:
the less scene variation there is, the more truly overinformative the use of the redundant modifier
is. Referring to the big purple stapler when there are only purple staplers in the scene should
be considered overinformative. If there is one red stapler, the utterance should be judged less
overinformative, and the more non-purple staplers there are, the less overinformative the utterance
should be judged. We leave a systematic test of this prediction for our stimuli for future research,
though we point to some qualitative examples where it has been borne out previously in the next
subsection.
6.4 Comprehension
While the account proposed in this paper is an account of the production of referring expressions, it
can be extended straightforwardly to comprehension. RSA models typically assume that listeners
interpret utterances by reasoning about their model of the speaker. In this paper we have provided
precisely such a model of the speaker. In what way should the predicted speaker probabilities enter
into comprehension? There are two interpretations of this question: first, what is the ultimate
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interpretation that listeners who reason about speakers characterized by the model provided in
this paper arrive at, i.e. what are the predictions for referent choice? And second, how do the
production probabilities enter into online processing of prima facie overinformative utterances?
The first question has a clear answer. For the second question we offer a more speculative answer.
6.4.1 Choice of referent
Most RSA reference models, unlike the one reported in this paper, have focused on comprehension
(M. C. Frank & Goodman, 2012; Degen et al., 2013; Qing & Franke, 2015; Franke & Degen, 2016).
The formula that characterizes pragmatic listeners’ referent choices is:
PL1(o|u) ∝ PS1(u|o) · P (o) (8)
That is, the pragmatic listener interprets utterance u (e.g., the big purple stapler) via Bayesian
inference, taking into account both the speaker probability of producing the big purple stapler and
its alternatives, given a particular object o the speaker had in mind, as well as the listener’s prior
beliefs about which object the speaker is likely to intend to refer to in the context. For the situations
considered in this paper, in which the utterance is semantically compatible with only one of the
referents in the context, this always predicts that the listener should choose the target. And indeed,
in Exps. 1-3 the error rate on the listeners’ end was always below 1%. From a referent choice point
of view, then, these contexts are not very interesting. They are much more interesting from an
online processing point of view, which we discuss next.
6.4.2 Online processing
The question that has typically been asked about the online processing of redundant utterances is
this: do redundant utterances, compared to their minimally specified alternatives, help or hinder
comprehenders in choosing the intended referent? ‘Help’ and ‘hinder’ are typically translated into
‘speed up’ and ‘slow down’, respectively. What does the RSA model presented here have to say
about this?
In sentence processing, the current wisdom is that the processing effort spent on linguistic
material is related to how surprising it is (Hale, 2001; Levy, 2008). In particular, an utterance’s log
reading time is linear in its surprisal (Smith & Levy, 2013), where surprisal is defined as − log p(u).
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In these studies, surprisal is usually estimated from linguistic corpora. Consequently, an utterance
of the big purple stapler receives a particular probability estimate independent of the non-linguistic
context it occurred in. Here we provide a speaker model from which we can derive estimates of
pragmatic surprisal directly for a particular context. We can thus speculate on a linking hypothesis:
the more expected a redundant utterance is under the pragmatic continuous semantics speaker
model, the faster it should be to process compared to its minimally specified alternative, all else
being equal. We have shown that redundant expressions are more likely than minimal expressions
when the sufficient dimension is relatively noisy and scene variation is relatively high. Under our
speculative linking hypothesis, the redundant expression should be easier to process in these sorts
of contexts than in contexts where the redundant expression is relatively less likely.
Is there evidence that listeners do behave in accordance with this prediction? Indeed, the
literature reports evidence that in situations where the redundant modifier does provide some
information about the referent, listeners are faster to respond and select the intended referent
when they observe a redundant referring expression than when they observe a minimal one (Arts et
al., 2011; Paraboni et al., 2007). However, there is also evidence that redundancy sometimes incurs
a processing cost: both Engelhardt, Demiral, and Ferreira (2011) and Davies and Katsos (2013)
(Exp. 2) found that listeners were slower to identify the target referent in response to redundant
compared to minimal utterances. It is useful to examine the stimuli they used. In the Engelhardt et
al study, there was only one distractor that varied in type, i.e., type was sufficient for establishing
reference. This distractor varied either in size or in color. Thus, scene variation was very low
and redundant expressions therefore likely surprising. Interestingly, the incurred cost was greater
for redundant size than for redundant color modifiers, in line with the RSA predictions that color
should be generally more likely to be used redundantly than size. In the Davies et al. study, the
‘overinformative’ conditions contained displays of four objects which differed in type. Stimuli were
selected via a production pre-test: only those objects that in isolation were not referred to with
a modifier were selected for the study. That is, stimuli were selected precisely on the basis that
redundant modifier use would be unlikely.
While the online processing of redundant referring expressions is yet to be systematically ex-
plored under the cs-RSA account, this cursory overview of the patterns reported in the existing
literature suggests that pragmatic surprisal may be a plausible linking function from model predic-
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tions to processing times. Excitingly, it has the potential for unifying the equivocal processing time
evidence by providing a model of utterance probabilities that can be computed from the features
of the objects in the context.
6.5 Continuous semantics
The crucial component of the model that allows for capturing ‘overinformativeness’ effects is the
continuous semantics. In this section, we consider the nature of these continuous semantic values.
Readers already convinced of the utility of a continuous semantics are invited to skip to the next
section.
For the purpose of Exp. 1 (modifier choice), a semantic value was assigned to modifier type.
The semantics of modifiers was underlyingly truth-conditional and the semantic value captured the
probability that a modifier’s truth conditions would accidentally be inverted. This model included
only two semantic values, one for size and one for color, which we inferred from the data. For the
datasets from Exps. 2 and 3, we then extended the continuous semantics to apply at the level of
utterance-object combinations (e.g., banana vs. blue banana as applied to the blue banana item,
dalmatian vs. dog as applied to the dalmatian item) to account for typicality effects in modifier and
nominal choice. In this instantiation of the model, the semantic value differed for every utterance-
object combination and captured how good of an instance of an utterance an object was. These
values were elicited experimentally to avoid over-fitting, and for the dataset from Exp. 2 we found
further that a combination of a relaxed (noisy) truth-conditional semantics and the empirically
elicited continuous semantics best accounted for the obtained production data.
What we have said nothing about thus far is what determines these semantic values; in particu-
lar, which aspects of language users’ experience – perceptual, conceptual, communicative, linguistic
– they represent. We will offer some speculative remarks and directions for future research here.
First, semantic values may represent the difficulty associated with verifying whether the prop-
erty denoted by the utterance holds of the object. This difficulty may be perceptual – for example,
it may be relatively easier to visually determine of an object whether it is red than whether it it is
big (at least in our stimuli). Similarly, at the object-utterance level, it may be easier to determine
of a yellow banana than of a blue banana whether it exhibits banana-hood, consequently yielding a
lower semantic value for a blue banana than for a yellow banana as an instance of banana. Further,
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the value may be context-invariant or context-dependent. If it is context-invariant, the semantic
value inferred for color vs. size, for instance, should not vary by making size differences more salient
and color differences less salient. If, instead, it is context-dependent, increasing the salience of size
differences and decreasing the salience of color differences should result, e.g., in color modifiers
being more noisy, with concomitant effects on production, i.e., redundant color modifiers should
become less likely. This is indeed what Viethen, van Vessem, Goudbeek, and Krahmer (2017)
found. Similarly, van Gompel, Gatt, Krahmer, and van Deemter (2014) found that the asymmetry
in redundant use of color vs. with size disappeared when participants were shown displays with
very noticeable size contrasts and barely noticeable color contrasts.
Another possibility is that semantic values represent aspects of agents’ prior beliefs (world
knowledge) about the correlations between features of objects. For example, conditioning on an
object being a banana, experience dictates that the probability of it being yellow is much greater
than of it being blue. This predicts the relative ordering of the typicality values we elicited empir-
ically, i.e., the blue banana received a lower semantic value than the yellow banana as an instance
of banana.
Another possibility is that the semantic values capture the past probability of communicative
success in using a particular expression. For example, the semantic value of banana as applied to a
yellow banana may be high because in the past, referring to yellow bananas simply as banana was on
average successful. Conversely, the semantic value of banana as applied to a blue banana may be low
because in the past, referring to blue bananas simply as banana was on average unsuccessful (or the
speaker may have uncertainty about its communicative success because they have never encountered
blue bananas before). Similarly, the noise difference between color and size modifiers may be due
to the inherent relativity of size modifiers compared to color modifiers – while color modifiers
vary somewhat in meaning across domains (consider, e.g., the difference in redness between red
hair and red wine), the interpretation of size modifiers is highly dependent on a comparison class
(consider, e.g., the difference between a big phone and a big building). In negotiating what counts
as red, then, speakers are likely to agree more often than in negotiating what counts as big. That
is, size adjectives are more subjective than color adjectives. If semantic values encode adjective
subjectivity, speakers should be even more likely to redundantly use adjectives that are more
objective than color. In a study showing that adjective subjectivity is almost perfectly correlated
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with an adjective’s average distance from the noun, Scontras et al. (2017) collected subjectivity
ratings for many different adjectives and found that material adjectives like wooden and plastic are
rated to be even more objective than color adjectives. Thus, under the hypothesis that semantic
values represent adjective subjectivity, material adjectives should be even more likely to be used
redundantly than color adjectives. This is not the case. For instance, Sedivy (2003) reports
that material adjectives are used redundantly about as often as size adjectives. Hence, while the
hypothesis that semantic values capture the past probability of communicative success in using a
particular expression has yet to be systematically investigated, subjectivity alone seems not to be
the determining factor.
Finally, it is also possible that semantic values are simply an irreducible part of the lexical entry
of each utterance-object pair. This seems unlikely because it would require a separate semantic
value for each utterance and object token, and most potentially encounterable object tokens in
the world have not been encountered, making it impossible to store utterance-token-level values.
However, it is possible that, reminiscent of prototype theory, semantic values are stored at the
level of utterances and object types. This view of semantic values suggests that they should not be
updated in response to further exposure of objects. For example, if semantic values were a fixed
component of the lexical entry banana, then even being exposed to a large number of blue bananas
should not change the value. This seems unlikely but merits further investigation.
The various possibilities for the interpretation of the continuous semantic values included in the
model are neither independent nor incompatible with each other. Disentangling these possibilities
presents an exciting avenue for future research.
What is highlighted by the above discussion is that we have been using the term ‘semantics’
at a fairly high level, to refer to conventional aspects of meaning that are relatively stable across
contexts – in RSA these are the representations on which the literal listener performs computations.
These real valued representations could be primitives arising in lexical representations and threading
through composition, which would constitute a fundamentally different basic semantics than has
often been assumed. Alternatively, the necessary real values could arise by adding the right kind
of use or world-knowledge related noise to a standard Boolean truth-conditional semantics. Most
minimally, intensional parameters of a standard semantics could be set stochastically. Whatever
their source, these continuous values provide the right basis for capturing the production choices
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explored in this paper. When to assume a relaxed semantics, and what the implications of such a
relaxation are for other semantic and pragmatic phenomena, are questions for future research.
6.6 Audience design
One question which has plagued the literature on language production is that of whether, and to
what extent, speakers actually tailor their utterances to their audience (Clark & Murphy, 1982;
Horton & Keysar, 1996; Brown-Schmidt & Heller, 2014). This is also known as the issue of audience
design. With regards to redundant referring expressions, the question is whether speakers produce
redundant expressions because it is helpful to them (i.e., due to internal production pressures)
or because it is helpful to their interlocutor. For instance, Walker (1993) shows that redundancy
is more likely when processing resources are limited. On the other hand, there is evidence that
redundant utterances are frequently used in response to signs of listener non-comprehension, when
responding to listener questions, or when speaking to strangers (Baker, Gill, & Cassell, 2008).
Audience design has played an especially large role in explanations of typicality effects. For example,
Huettig and Altmann (2011) found that listeners, after hearing a noun with a diagnostic color (e.g.,
frog), are more likely to fixate objects of that diagnostic color (green), indicating that typical object
features like color are rapidly activated and aid visual search. Similarly, Arts et al. (2011) showed
that overspecified expressions result in faster referent identification. Nevertheless, such benefits
might simply be a happy coincidence and speakers might not, in fact, be deliberately designing
their utterances for their addressees.
RSA seems to make a claim about this issue: speakers are trying to be informative with respect
to a literal listener. That is, it would seem that speakers produce referring expressions that are
tailored to their listeners. However, this is misleading. The ontological status of the literal listener
is as a “dummy component” that allows the pragmatic recursion to get off the ground. Actual
listeners are, in line with previous work and briefly discussed above, more likely fall into the class
of pragmatic L1 listeners; listeners who reason about the speaker’s intended meaning via Bayesian
inference (M. C. Frank & Goodman, 2012; Goodman & Stuhlmu¨ller, 2013).34 Because RSA is a
computational-level theory (Marr, 1982) of language use, it does not claim that the mechanism of
34But see Franke and Degen (2016) for an evaluation of the distribution of listener and speaker types in Quantity
inferences.
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language production requires that speakers actively consult an internal model of a listener every time
they choose an utterance, just that the distribution of utterances they produce reflect informativity
with respect to such a model. It is possible that this distribution is cached or computed using
some other algorithm that doesn’t explicitly involve a listener component. Thus, the RSA model
as formulated here remains agnostic about whether speakers’ (over-) informativeness should be
considered geared towards listeners’ needs or simply a production-internal process. Instead, the
claim is that redundancy emerges as a property of the communicative situation as a whole.
6.7 Other factors that affect redundancy
RSA with a continuous semantics as presented in this paper straightforwardly accounts for effects
of typicality, cost, and scene variation on redundancy in referring expressions. However, other
factors have been identified as contributing to redundancy. For example, Rubio-Fernandez (2016)
showed that colors are mentioned more often redundantly for clothes than for geometrical shapes.
Her explanation is that knowing an object’s color is generally more useful for clothing than it is for
shapes. It is plausible that agents’ knowledge of goals may be relevant here. For example, knowing
the color of clothing is relevant to the goal of deciding what to wear or buy. In contrast, knowing
the color of geometrical shapes is rarely relevant to any everyday goal agents might have. While
the RSA model as implemented here does not accommodate an agent’s goals, it can be extended
to do so via projection functions, as has been done for capturing figurative language use (e.g., Kao,
Wu, Bergen, & Goodman, 2014) or question-answer behavior (Hawkins, Stuhlmu¨ller, Degen, &
Goodman, 2015). This should be explored further in future research.
One factor that has been repeatedly discussed in the literature and that we have not taken
up here is the incrementality of language production, both at the conceptual level of content or
property selection and at the level of linguistic realization. For instance, according to Pechmann
(1989), incrementality is to blame for redundancy: speakers retrieve and subsequently produce
words as soon as they can. Because color modifiers are easier to retrieve than size modifiers, speak-
ers produce them regardless of whether or not they are redundant. The problem with this account
is that it predicts that color adjectives should occur before size adjectives, thereby inverting the
well-documented adjective ordering preferences for English (Bloomfield, 1933; Sproat & Shih, 1991;
Scontras et al., 2017). Pechmann does observe some, but not many, instances of this. An interest-
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ing test case for the incrementality hypothesis are cases where adjective ordering preferences are
weak. Fukumura (2018) reports one such case in which speakers prefer to order more discrimina-
tive and more available properties before less discriminative and less available ones, highlighting
incrementality as an important factor affecting the choice of referring expression. On the other
hand, it is unclear how incrementality – whether in linguistic realization or in content selection –
could account for the systematic increase in color redundancy with increasing scene variation and
decreasing color typicality, unless one makes the auxiliary assumption that the more contextually
discriminative or salient color is, the more available (i.e., easily retrievable) the modifier is. Indeed,
Clark and Bangerter (2004) emphasize the importance of salience against the common ground in
speakers’ decisions about which of an object’s properties to include in a referring expression.
There are other ways incrementality could play a role in modifier choice. For example, men-
tioning the color adjective may buy the speaker time when the noun is hard to retrieve. This
predicts that in languages with post-nominal adjectives, where this delay strategy cannot be used
for noun planning, redundant color mention should be less frequent; indeed, this is what Rubio-
Fernandez (2016) shows for Spanish.35 In sum, the incrementality of language production clearly
affects the choice of referring expression; the ways in which considerations of incrementality should
be incorporated in RSA are to be explored further (see Cohn-Gordon et al., 2018, for a step in this
direction).
6.8 Extensions to other language production phenomena
In this paper we focused on providing a computationally explicit account of definite modified
and nominal referring expressions in reference games, focusing on the use of prenominal size and
color adjectives as well as on the taxonomic level of noun reference. The cs-RSA model can be
straightforwardly extended to different nominal domains and different properties. For instance, the
literature has also explored ‘overinformative’ referring expressions that include material (wooden,
35Rubio-Ferna´ndez herself argues for an efficiency-based account of the Spanish/English asymmetry in color over-
modification: “color adjectives are a more efficient cue in pre-nominal position than in post-nominal position because
in the latter case the hearer’s visual search is initially guided by the noun” (Rubio-Fernandez, 2016, p. 9). Cs-RSA as
presented here does not predict positional asymmetries in modifier use. However, see Cohn-Gordon, Goodman, and
Potts (2018) for an incremental version of RSA that captures the asymmetry reported by Rubio-Fernandez (2016) as
the result of incremental rather than global reasoning about utterance informativeness.
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plastic), other dimensional (long, short), and other physical (spotted, striped) adjectives.
However, beyond the relatively limited linguistic forms we have explored here, future research
should also investigate the very intriguing potential for this approach to be extended to any language
production phenomenon that involves a choice in which aspects of an event or entity to mention
(content selection) and how to realize that content linguistically, including in the domain of reference
(pronouns, names, definite descriptions with post-nominal modification) and event descriptions. For
example, in investigations of optional instrument mentions, P. Brown and Dell (1987) showed that
atypical instruments are more likely to be mentioned than typical ones – if a stabbing occurred
with an icepick, speakers prefer The man was stabbed with an ice pick rather than The man was
stabbed. If instead a stabbing occurred with a knife, The man was stabbed is preferred over The
man was stabbed with a knife). This is very much parallel to the case of atypical color mention.
Similarly, the approach outlined here might be extended to the case of non-restrictive modifiers.
In these cases, the modifier is not used to distinguish a target referent from possible competitors.
Instead, the speaker may intend to communicate an aspect of an already contextually established
referent, as in Sit by the newly painted table, where the speaker is warning the listener not to put
their elbows on the table (Dale & Reiter, 1995); or Forrest looks at the massive crowd, where the
speaker is commenting on the extraordinary size of the crowd (Hahn, Degen, Goodman, Jurafsky,
& Futrell, 2018). In these cases, the table and the crowd are contextually given referents; the
modifiers newly painted and massive are used to highlight informative aspects of these referents.
The approach proposed in this paper could be extended to these cases by allowing the speaker to
be informative with respect to goals other than getting the listener to infer the intended referent.
For instance, the speaker may want to be informative with respect to the goal of highlighting
task-relevant properties of contextually given referents, as in the newly painted table case.
More generally, the approach should extend to any phenomenon that affords a choice between
a more or less specific utterance. Whenever the more specific utterance adds relevant information
compared to the less specific one, it should be produced. This is related to surprisal based the-
ories of production like Uniform Information Density (UID, Jaeger, 2006; Levy & Jaeger, 2007;
A. Frank & Jaeger, 2008; Jaeger, 2010), where speakers have been found to be more likely to
omit linguistic signal if the underlying meaning or syntactic structure is highly predictable to the
listener. Importantly, UID diverges from our account in that it is an account of the choice between
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meaning-equivalent alternative utterances and includes no pragmatic reasoning component.
6.9 Conclusion
In conclusion, we have provided an account of redundant referring expressions that challenges the
traditional notion of ‘overinformativeness’, unifies multiple language production literatures, and
has the potential for many further extensions. We take this work to provide evidence that, rather
than being wastefully overinformative, speakers are usefully redundant.
A Effects of semantic value on utterance probabilities
Here we visualize the effect of different adjective types’ semantic value on the probability of pro-
ducing the insufficient color-only utterance (blue pin), the sufficient size-only utterance (small pin),
or the redundant color-and-size utterance (small blue pin) to refer to the target in context Figure
1a under varying βi values, in Figure 20. This constitutes a generalization of Figure 4, which is
duplicated in row 6 (βi = 30).
B Pre-experiment quiz
Before continuing to the main experiment, each participant was required to correctly respond
“True” or “False” to the following statements. Correct answers are given in parentheses after the
statement.
• The speaker can click on an object. (False)
• The listener wants to click on the object that the speaker is telling them about. (True)
• The target is the object which has the red circle around it. (False)
• Only the speaker can send messages. (False)
• There are a total of 72 rounds. (True)
• The locations of the three objects are the same for the speaker and the listener. (False)
USEFULLY REDUNDANT REFERRING EXPRESSIONS 64
'small' 'blue' 'small blue'
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0.50.60.70.80.91.0 0.50.60.70.80.91.0 0.50.60.70.80.91.0
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Semantic value of size
Se
m
an
tic
 va
lu
e 
of
 c
ol
or
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Probability
of utterance
Figure 20: Probability of producing sufficient small pin, insufficient blue pin, and redundant small
blue pin in contexts as depicted in Figure 1a, as a function of semantic value of color and size
utterances and varying βi row-wise (for βc = 0).
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C Exp. 1 items
Table 9 lists the 36 object types from Exp. 1 and the colors they appeared in:
Table 9: Exp. 1 items and the colors they appeared in.
Object Colors Object Colors
avocado black, green balloon pink, yellow
belt black, brown bike purple, red
billiard ball orange, purple binder blue, green
book black, blue bracelet green, purple
bucket pink, red butterfly blue, purple
candle blue, red cap blue, orange
chair green, red coat hanger orange, purple
comb black, blue cushion blue, orange
flower purple, red frame green, pink
golf ball blue, pink guitar blue, green
hair dryer pink, purple jacket brown, green
napkin orange, yellow ornament blue, purple
pepper green, red phone pink, white
rock green, purple rug blue, purple
shoe white, yellow stapler purple, red
thumb tack blue, red tea cup pink, white
toothbrush blue, red turtle black, brown
wedding cake pink, white yarn purple, red
D Data pre-processing and exclusions
D.1 Exp. 1
Median completion time was 10 minutes. One participant was excluded because their native lan-
guage was not English (but they participated in the listener role, so their exclusion was of no
consequence to the analysis). 83% of participants thought their partner was human. Participants
were not excluded if they didn’t believe their partner was human.
We collected data from 2177 critical trials. Because we did not restrict participants’ utterances
in any way, they produced many different kinds of referring expressions. Testing the model’s
predictions required, for each trial, classifying the produced utterance as an instance of a color -only
mention, a size-only mention, or a color-and-size mention (or excluding the trial if no classification
was possible). To this end we conducted the following semi-automatic data pre-processing.
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An R script first automatically checked whether the speaker’s utterance contained a precoded
color (i.e. black, blue, brown, gold, green, orange, pink, purple, red, silver, violet, white, yellow)
or size (i.e. big, bigger, biggest, huge, large, larger, largest, little, small, smaller, smallest, tiny)
term. In this way, 95.7 % of cases were classified as mentioning size and/or color. However, this did
not capture that sometimes, participants produced meaning-equivalent modifications of color/size
terms for instance by adding suffixes (e.g., bluish), using abbreviations (e.g., lg for large or purp
for purple), or using non-precoded color labels (e.g., lime or lavender). Expressions containing a
typo (e.g., pruple instead of purple) could also not be classified automatically. In the next step,
one of the authors (CG) therefore manually checked the automatic coding to include these kinds of
modifications in the analysis. This covered another 1.9% of trials. Most of the time, participants
converged on a convention of producing only the target’s size and/or color, e.g., purple or big
blue, but not a determiner (e.g., the) or the noun corresponding to the object’s type (e.g., comb).
Determiners were omitted in 88.6 % of cases and nouns were omitted in 71.6 % of cases. We did
not analyze this any further.
There were 50 cases (2.3%) in which the speaker made reference to the distinguishing dimension
in an abstract way, e.g. different color, unique one, ripest, very girly, or guitar closest to viewer.
While interesting as utterance choices,36 these cases were excluded from the analysis. There were
3 cases that were nonsensical, e.g. bigger off a shade, which were also excluded. In 6 cases only the
insufficient dimension was mentioned – these were excluded from the analysis reported in the next
section, where we are only interested in minimal or redundant utterances, not underinformative
ones, but were included in the Bayesian data analysis reported in Section 3.3. Finally, we excluded
six trials where the speaker did not produce any utterances, and 33 trials on which the listener
selected the wrong referent, leading to the elimination of 1.5% of trials. After the exclusion, 2076
cases classified as one of color, size, or color-and-size entered the analysis.
36Certain participants seemed to have deliberately used this as a strategy even though simply mentioning the
distinguishing property would have been shorter in most cases. In all, only 12 participants produced these kinds of
utterances: one 18 times, one 8 times, one 6 times, two 3 times, one 2 times, and the remaining six only once each.
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D.2 Exp. 2
Median completion time was 7 minutes. All participants self-reported English as their native
language. 93% of participants thought their partner was human. Participants were not excluded if
they believed their partner was human.
Two participant-pairs were excluded because they did not finish the experiment and therefore
could not receive payment. Trials on which the speaker did not produce any utterances were
also excluded, resulting in the exclusion of two additional participant-pairs. Finally, there were
10 speakers who consistently used roundabout descriptions instead of direct referring expressions
(e.g., monkeys love. . . to refer to banana).37 These pairs were also excluded, since such indirect
expressions do not inform our questions about modifier production.
We analyzed data from 1974 trials. Just as in Exp. 1, participants communicated freely, which
led to a vast amount of different referring expressions. To test the model’s predictions, the utterance
produced for each trial was to be classified as belonging to one of the following categories: type-
only (“banana”), color-and-type (“yellow banana”), and color-only (“yellow”) utterances. Referring
expressions that included superordinate categories (“yellow fruit”), descriptions (“has green stem”),
color-circumscriptions (“funky carrot”), and negations (“yellow but not banana”) were regarded as
other and excluded. To this end we conducted the following semi-automatic data pre-processing.
The referring expressions were analyzed similarly to Exp. 1. First, 32 trials (1.6%) were excluded
because the listener selected the wrong referent. 109 trials (5.6%) were excluded because the
referring expressions included one of the exceptional cases described above (e.g., using negations).
An R script then automatically checked the remaining 1833 utterances for whether they contained a
precoded color term (i.e. green, purple, white, black, brown, yellow, orange, blue, pink, red, grey) or
type (i.e. apple, banana, carrot, tomato, pear, pepper, avocado). This way, 96.5% of the remaining
cases were classified as mentioning type and/or color.
However, this did not capture that sometimes, participants produced meaning-equivalent mod-
37It is unclear whether these participants misunderstood task instructions, or were simply being playful. This is
interestingly different from Exp. 1, where participants did not produce such descriptions, presumably because the
object type was identical and therefore there were no differences between objects except for color and size. We
speculate that on average the functional differences between objects that differ in type are greater than between
those that differ in color or size, with the former consequently being more inspiring for the generation of creative
referring expressions.
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ifications of color/type terms for instance by adding suffixes (e.g., pinkish), using abbreviations
(e.g., yel for yellow), or using non-precoded color and type labels (e.g., lavender or jalapeno). In
addition, expressions that contained a typo (e.g., blakc instead of black) could also not be classified
automatically. One of the authors (EK) therefore manually hand-coded these cases. There were
6 cases (0.3%) that could not be categorized and were excluded. Overall, 1827 utterances were
classified as one of color, type, or color-and-type entered the analysis.
D.3 Exp. 3
We collected 2193 referring expressions. To determine the level of reference for each trial, we
followed the following procedure. First, speakers’ and listeners’ messages were parsed automatically;
the referring expression used by the speaker was extracted for each trial and checked for whether
it contained the current target’s correct sub(ordinate), basic, or super(ordinate) level term using
a simple grep search. In this way, 71.4% of trials were labelled as mentioning a pre-coded level of
reference. In the next step, remaining utterances were checked manually by one of the authors (CG)
to determine whether they contained a correct level of reference term which was not detected by
the grep search due to typos or grammatical modification of the expression. In this way, meaning-
equivalent alternatives such as doggie for dog, or reduced forms such as gummi, gummies and bears
for gummy bears were counted as containing the corresponding level of reference term. This covered
another 15.0% of trials. 41 trials on which the listener selected the wrong referent were excluded,
leading to the elimination of 2.1% of trials. Six trials were excluded because the speaker did not
produce any utterances. Additionally, a total of 12.5% of correct trials were excluded because the
utterance consisted only of an attribute of the superclass (the living thing for animal), of the basic
level (can fly for bird), of the subcategory (barks for dog) or of the particular instance (the thing
facing left) rather than a category noun. These kinds of attributes were also mentioned in addition
to the noun on trials which were included in the analysis for 8.9% of sub level terms, 18.9% of
basic level terms, and 60.9% of super level terms. On 1.2% of trials two different levels of reference
were mentioned; in this case the more specific level of reference was counted as being mentioned in
this trial. After all exclusion and pre-processing, 1872 cases classified as one of sub, basic, or super
entered into the analysis.
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E Typicality effects in Exp. 1
To assess whether we replicate the color typicality effects previously reported in the literature
(Sedivy, 2003; Westerbeek et al., 2015; Rubio-Fernandez, 2016), we elicited color typicality norms
for each of the items in Exp. 1 and then included typicality as an additional predictor of redundant
adjective use in the regression analysis reported in Section 3.2.
E.1 Methods
E.1.1 Participants
We recruited 60 participants over Amazon’s Mechanical Turk who were each paid $0.25 for their
participation.
E.1.2 Procedure and materials
On each trial, participants saw one of the big versions of the items used in Exp. 1 and were asked to
answer the question “How typical is this for an X ?” on a continuous slider with endpoints labeled
“very atypical” to “very typical.” X was a referring expression consisting of either only the correct
noun (e.g., stapler) or the noun modified by the correct color (e.g., red stapler). Figure 21 shows
an example of a modified trial.
Each participant saw each of the 36 objects once. An object was randomly displayed in one
of the two colors it occurred with in Exp. 1 and was randomly displayed with either the correct
modified utterance or the correct unmodified utterance, in order to obtain roughly equal numbers
of object-utterance combinations.
Importantly, we only elicited typicality norms for unmodified utterances and utterances with
color modifiers, but not utterances with size modifiers. This was because it is impossible to obtain
size typicality norms for objects presented in isolation, due to the inherently relational nature of size
adjectives. Consequently, we only test for the effect of typicality on size-sufficient trials, i.e. when
color is redundant.
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Figure 21: A modified example trial from the typicality elicitation experiment.
E.2 Results and discussion
We coded the slider endpoints as 0 (“very atypical”) and 1 (“very typical”), essentially treating
each response as a typicality value between 0 and 1. For each combination of object, color, and
utterance (modified/unmodified), we computed that item’s mean. Mean typicalities were generally
lower for unmodified than for modified utterances: mean typicality for unmodified utterances was
.67 (sd=.17, mode=.76) and for modified utterances .75 (sd=.12, mode=.81). This can also be seen
on the left in Figure 22. Note that, as expected given how the stimuli were constructed, typicality
was generally skewed towards the high end, even for unmodified utterances. This means that there
was not much variation in the difference in typicality between modified and unmodified utterances.
We will refer to this difference as typicality gain, reflecting the overall gain in typicality via color
modification over the unmodified baseline. As can be seen on the right in Figure 22, in most cases
typicality gain was close to zero.
This makes the typicality analysis difficult: if typicality gain is close to zero for most cases
(and, taking into account confidence intervals, effectively zero), it is hard to evaluate the effect
of typicality on redundant adjective use. In order to maximize power, we therefore conducted the
analysis only on those items for which for at least one color the confidence intervals for the modified
and unmodified utterances did not overlap. There were only four such cases: (pink) golfball, (pink)
wedding cake, (green) chair, and (red) stapler, for a total of 231 data points.
Predictions differ for size-sufficient and color-sufficient trials. Given the typicality effects re-
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Figure 22: Typicality densities for modified and unmodified utterances (left) and histogram of
typicality gains (differences between modified and unmodified typicalities, right).
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Figure 23: Utterance probability for four items as a function of difference in typicality between
modified and unmodified utterance (x-axis) and sufficient dimension (columns).
ported in the literature and the predictions of cs-RSA, we expect greater redundant color use
on size-sufficient trials with increasing typicality gain. The predictions for redundant size use on
color-sufficient trials are unclear from the previous literature. Cs-RSA, however, predicts greater
redundant size use with decreasing typicality gain: small color typicality gains reflect the relatively
low out-of-context utility of color. In these cases, it may be useful to redundantly use a size mod-
ifier even if that modifier is noisy. If borne out, these predictions should surface in an interaction
between sufficient property and typicality gain. Visual inspection of the empirical proportions of
redundant adjective use in Figure 23 suggests that this pattern is indeed borne out.
In order to investigate the effect of typicality gain on redundant adjective use, we conducted
a mixed effects logistic regression analysis predicting redundant over minimal adjective use from
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Table 10: Model coefficients, standard errors, and p-values. Significant p-values are bolded.
Coef β SE(β) p
Intercept −1.85 0.34 <.0001
Scene variation 4.29 1.16 <.001
Sufficient property 2.72 0.60 <.0001
Scene variation : Sufficient property 0.88 2.12 <0.68
Sufficient property : Typicality gain 9.43 2.68 <.001
fixed effects of scene variation, sufficient dimension, the interaction of scene variation and sufficient
property, and the interaction of typicality gain and sufficient property. This is the same model as
reported in Section 3.2, with the only difference that the interaction between sufficient property
and typicality gain was added. All predictors were centered before entering the analysis. The
model contained the most sophisticated random effects structure that allowed it to converge: by-
participant and by-item (where item was a color-object combination) random intercepts.
The model summary is shown in Table 10. We replicate the effects of sufficient property
and scene variation observed earlier on this smaller dataset. Crucially, we observe a significant
interaction between sufficient property and typicality gain.38 Simple effects analysis reveals that
this interaction is due to a positive effect of typicality gain on redundant adjective use in the size-
sufficient condition (β = 4.47, SE = 1.65, p < .007) but a negative effect of typicality gain on
redundant adjective use in the color-sufficient condition (β = −5.77, SE = 2.49, p < .03).
An important point is of note: the typicality elicitation procedure we employed here is somewhat
different from that employed by Westerbeek et al. (2015), who asked their participants “How typical
is this color for this object?” We did this for conceptual reasons: the values that go into the
semantics of the RSA model are most easily conceptualized as the typicality of an object as an
instance of an utterance. While the typicality of a feature for an object type no doubt plays into
how good of an instance of the utterance the object is, deriving our typicalities from the statistical
properties of the subjective distributions of features over objects is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, in a separate experiment we did ask participants the Westerbeek question. The correlation
38Conducting the same analysis on the entire dataset (i.e., using all of the noisy typicality estimates, replicated the
scene variation and sufficient property effects. The interaction of typicality gain and sufficient property went in the
same direction numerically, but failed to reach significance (β = 1.52, SE = 1.45, p < .29).
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between mean typicality ratings from the Westerbeek version and the unmodified “How typical is
this for X ” version was .75. The correlation between the Westerbeek version and the modified
version was .64. The correlation between the Westerbeek version and typicality gain was -.52.
For comparison, including typicality means obtained via the Westerbeek question as a predictor
instead of typicality gain on the four high-powered items replicated the significant interaction be-
tween typicality and sufficient property (β = −6.77, SE = 1.88, p < .0003). Simple effects analysis
revealed that the interaction is again due to a difference in slope in the two sufficient property
conditions: in the size-sufficient condition, color is less likely to be mentioned with increasing color
typicality (β = −3.66, SE = 1.18, p < .002), whereas in the color-sufficient condition, size is more
likely to be mentioned with increasing color typicality (β = 3.09, SE = 1.45, p < .04).39
We thus overall find moderate evidence for typicality effects in our dataset. Typicality effects
are strong for those items that clearly display typicality differences between the modified and
unmodified utterance, but much weaker for the remaining items. That the evidence for typicality
effects is relatively scarce is no surprise: the stimuli were specifically designed to minimize effects of
typicality. However, the fact that both ways of quantifying typicality predicted redundant adjective
use in the expected direction suggests that with more power or with stimuli that exhibit greater
typicality variation, these effects may show up more clearly.
F Experiment 3 items
Table 11 lists all items used in Exp. 3 and the mean empirical utterance lengths that participants
produced to refer to them:
G Typicality norms for Experiment 3
Analogous to the color typicality norms elicited for utterances in Exps. 1-2, we elicited typicality
norms for utterances in Exp. 3. The elicited typicalities were used in the mixed effects analyses
and Bayesian Data Analysis reported in Section 5.
39Again, conducting this analysis on the entire dataset yielded only a marginal interaction of sufficient property
and color typicality in the right direction (β = −1.10, SE = .64, p < .09).
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Table 11: List of domains and associated superordinate category, target stimuli, and mean length
(standard deviation) in characters of actually produced subordinate level utterances in Exp. 3.
Domain Super Targets Mean sub length (sd)
bear animal
black bear 9.9 (.14)
polar bear 8.8 (.35)
panda bear 5.5 (.2)
grizzly bear 9 (.98)
bird animal
eagle 4.9 (.1)
parrot 6.1 (.13)
pigeon 5.9 (.22)
hummingbird 10.1 (.5)
candy snack
MnMs 4.4 (.49)
skittles 6.9 (.43)
gummy bears 8.5 (.47)
jelly beans 9.3 (.44)
car vehicle
SUV 3 (0)
minivan 5.7 (.27)
sports car 9.8 (.23)
convertible 11.1 (.2)
dog animal
pug 3 (.08)
husky 4.7 (.22)
dalmatian 8.8 (.18)
German Shepherd 13.1 (.82)
fish animal
catfish 6.6 (.4)
goldfish 7.9 (.22)
swordfish 8 (.43)
clownfish 9.1 (.38)
flower plant
rose 4 (0)
tulip 4.4 (.18)
daisy 5.9 (.55)
sunflower 9 (.11)
shirt clothing
T-shirt 6.4 (.48)
polo shirt 6.7 (.79)
dress shirt 11 (0)
Hawaii shirt 12.6 (.46)
table furniture
picnic table 9.7 (.58)
dining table 12 (0)
coffee table 9.1 (.95)
bedside table 8.3 (.68)
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G.0.1 Methods
Participants We recruited 240 participants over Amazon’s Mechanical Turk who were each paid
$0.50 for their participation.
Procedure and materials On each trial, participants saw one of the images used in Exp. 3
and were asked to answer the question “How typical is this for an X ?” on a continuous slider with
endpoints labeled “very atypical” to “very typical.” X was a nominal referring expression. We
did not test all utterance-object combinations, which would have led to an explosion of conditions.
Instead, we tested each target object with its three utterances (e.g., the dalamtian was paired
with dalmatian, dog, and animal ; the pug was paired with pug, dog, and animal, etc.). That
yielded a total of 108 combinations – four targets in nine domains with three utterances each. We
further tested each distractor item that shared the target’s superordinate category (dist-samesuper,
e.g., elephants share the superordinate category animal with dogs) on both the basic level and
the superordinate level term (e.g., dog for elephant and animal for elephant), for a total of 469
combinations. Finally, we also tested each distractor of a different superordinate category than
the target on the target’s superordinate level term (dist-diffsuper, e.g., animal for rose). This
yielded another 168 combinations. Overall, we obtained typicality norms for 745 object-utterance
combinations. All other object-utterance combinations were assumed to have typicality 0. Each
participant rated 45 items: 7 targets, 10 dist-diffsuper, and 28 dist-samesuper cases. These were
randomly sampled from the overall pool of items in each category.
G.0.2 Results and discussion
Each combination was rated at least 5 times and at most 27 times. We coded the slider endpoints
as 0 (“very atypical”) and 1 (“very typical”). In order to evaluate the model, we used each object-
utterance combination’s typicality mean as input.
Typicality ratings by item type (target, dist-samesuper, dist-diffsuper) and utterance type (sub,
basic, super) are visualized in Figure 24. As expected, typicality was close to 0 for distractor items
with a different superordinate category as the target, and for subordinate/basic level terms used
with distractors of the same superordinate category. However, even for these cases, there was some
variation.
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For targets, typicality of the object for the utterance decreased with increasing reference level,
mirroring the typicality ratings obtained for Exp. 1 – a particular object is a better instance of the
more specific term than of the more general term for that object.
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Figure 24: Mean typicality ratings by utterance (target subordinate, basic, and superordinate level
term) for targets (e.g., dalmatian, left panel), distractors with a different superordinate category
from the target (e.g., rose, middle panel), and distractors with the same superordinate category as
the target (e.g., elephant, right panel). Error bars indicate bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.
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